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Comment
Mixing Oil & Water: Why Child-Custody
Evaluations are not Meshing with the
Best Interests of the Child
Bari L. Nathan*
The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides the
statutory requirements for marriage and dissolution of marriage in
Illinois. Section 604(b) gives courts the discretion to appoint an
evaluator in order to aid in the determination of child custody by
evaluating the relevant parties and writing a report. If and when these
604(b) evaluators are appointed, there are virtually no guidelines that
set forth what they may or may not do in the course of their evaluations.
As a result of this lack of guidelines, 604(b) evaluators often employ
clinical assessment instruments (i.e., psychological tests that assess
clinical constructs such as personality) in order to aid in coming to a
conclusion concerning custody. Judges often tend to favor an
evaluator’s opinion and fail to notice the tests’ biases and lack of
validity. As a result, the main determinant in child-custody decisions
often comes down to the conclusions of faulty psychological testing
despite the fact that other more effective methods such as interviewing
may have been used in the course of evaluation. This process leaves
much room for questioning whether the way child-custody evaluations
are being employed are in fact serving the best interests of the child.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 866
I. BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 870
A. Evolution of Child-Custody Standards .................................... 871
B. The Best Interest of the Child Standard in Illinois................... 875
C. Therapeutic v. Forensic Assessment ........................................ 876

* B.A., Indiana University Bloomington, 2013; J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law, 2016.

865

NATHAN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

866

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/27/2015 1:44 PM

[Vol. 46

D. Psychological Instruments....................................................... 879
E. Psychological Tests and How They Are Administered ............ 880
1. Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 ................ 882
2. Rorschach Inkblot Technique............................................. 884
3. Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory ................................. 884
F. History of Section 604(b) ......................................................... 885
II. DISCUSSION .................................................................................... 886
A. The Current State of the Law: Enforcement of
Section 604(b) ......................................................................... 887
B. How California Crafts Its Statute ............................................ 889
C. How Pennsylvania Crafts Its Statute ....................................... 892
D. Conclusion ............................................................................... 893
III. ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 894
A. Lack of 604(b) Guidelines for Illinois Courts .......................... 896
B. Unreliability and Biased Nature of Clinical Assessment
Instruments in Family Court Settings...................................... 898
1. Flawed Validity & Reliability ............................................ 899
2. Flawed Administration ....................................................... 903
C. The Direct Effect on the Custody Decision .............................. 905
IV. PROPOSAL ..................................................................................... 906
A. Necessary Guidelines ............................................................... 907
B. Abolishing the Use of Clinical Assessment Instruments In
Favor of Forensic Assessment Instruments in ChildCustody Proceedings ............................................................... 909
CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 911
INTRODUCTION
The purposes of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act (“IMDMA”)1 are to strengthen the integrity of marriage and
safeguard family relationships, promote settlement of disputes, mitigate
potential harm to spouses and their children, and crucially, to secure the
maximum possible involvement of both parents regarding their
children’s well-being.2 The language of the statute gives Illinois courts

1. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/101 (2014).
2. Id. at 5/102; see In re Marriage of Wade, 946 N.E.2d 485, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“It is
clear that the legislature intended for the circuit court to take the best interests and well-being of
the parties’ children into account while conducting the proceedings on a dissolution of
marriage.”); In re Marriage of Davis, 792 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he
overarching purpose of the [IMDMA] is to promote the best interest of the children . . . .”).
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the discretion to appoint an evaluator in order to help determine the
outcome of custody decisions.3 While the statute effectively grants this
authority to the courts, there are virtually no guidelines that set forth
who the evaluator can be, what qualifications he or she must have, how
the evaluators should conduct their evaluations, and what, if any,
methods should be employed in the evaluation.4 In most cases, courts
appoint mental-health experts like psychologists, psychiatrists, or social
workers.5
Given the flexibility that they have in conducting their evaluations,
most of these mental-health experts choose to conduct psychological
tests on the parents and child involved in the litigation in order to come
to a conclusion regarding their recommendation to the court.6 This
3. The statute uses the word “may” rather than “shall” to indicate that seeking the advice of
professional personnel is discretionary, not mandatory. See In re Marriage of Debra N. &
Michael S., 4 N.E.3d 78, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (acknowledging that it is within the court’s
discretion to seek independent expert advice).
4. David I. Grund & Danielle E. Kestnbaum, Child Custody Evaluations in the Circuit Court
of Cook County and Throughout Illinois Do Not Serve the Best Interest of the Child: A Critical
Consideration of the Flaws and Possible Solutions Thereto, in 2ND ANNUAL GRUND & LEAVITT
SYMPOSIUM ON CUTTING-EDGE FAMILY LAW ISSUES COURSE NOTEBOOK § 2-1, at 2 (2014); cf.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604.5. In contrast to section 604(b)’s lack of guidelines, section 605.5
evaluations, which are ordered at the request of one of the litigants, outline requirements for these
evaluations, including the requirement that the court must designate the time, place, conditions,
and scope of the evaluation. “Section 605 provides the remedy intended by the legislature in
cases where a party in a postdissolution proceeding seeks relevant evidence adduced in another
postdissolution proceeding.” Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 336 (Ill. 2011).
5. See In re Marriage of Auer, 407 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that the
testimony of psychologists is generally acceptable in child-custody cases); In re Marriage of
Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that the testimony of the psychologist
is not determinative of the issue of custody, yet it may be properly considered with respect to
whatever enlightenment it may provide the court in identifying the best interests of the children);
see also Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 332 (discussing how a psychiatrist was appointed by the court to
conduct an independent evaluation and assist the court pursuant to section 604(b)); In re Marriage
of Saheb and Khazal, 880 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (appointing a person with a
doctorate in social work to evaluate the parties and minor child); People ex rel. Rathbun v.
Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (stating that the trial court appointed a
clinical psychologist to interview the parties and everyone involved in the controversy and
present recommendations to the trial court).
6. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Iqbal and Khan, 11 N.E.3d 1, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (stating
that the evaluator conducted the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory); In re Marriage of
Gambla and Woodson, 853 N.E.2d 847, 851 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (discussing how specific parties
completed the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”), the Adult–
Adolescent Parenting Inventory, and the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-3 (“MCMI-3”)); In
re Marriage of Johnson, 815 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that the courtappointed psychologist administered the MMPI–2 to the parents in the litigation); In re Marriage
of Jaster, 583 N.E.2d 659, 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (discussing how the court-appointed evaluator
administered the MMPI-2 to the parties and met with the family members on approximately eight
days); In re Marriage of L.R. and A.L.R., 559 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that
the psychologist’s recommendations were based, in part, on the results of the Millon Clincial
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presents a problem because the most commonly used psychological
tests in family-court settings are what are known as clinical assessment
instruments (“CAIs”), which have been demonstrated to be unreliable,
invalid, and irrelevant in the context of child-custody proceedings.7
Evaluators base their conclusions on the results of these tests,8 and
judges often fail to notice or concern themselves with the tests’ biases.9
Judges tend to rely heavily on expert opinion, and therefore these
evaluations and testimonies are often dispositive on the outcome of the
custody decision.10 Consequently, judges’ custody decisions are often
influenced by the results of faulty psychological testing.11
Choosing whether or not to appoint an evaluator and deciding other
custody disputes requires courts to use the “best interest of the child”
standard, which requires courts to make decisions in accordance with
the child’s best interest.12 Courts weigh many factors in ascertaining

Multiaxial Inventory).
7. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 48 (3d ed.
2007); see Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that there is no reliable, custodyspecific psychological test currently available that is tailored for people in the middle of a custody
battle, nor are there any reliable tests that measure parenting capacity).
8. See David Brodzinksy, On the Use and Misuse of Psychological Testing in Child Custody
Evaluations, 24 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 213, 214 (1993) (“[P]sychologists routinely
overstep the boundaries of their professional role by offering opinions about custody and
visitation matters based to a great extent, and sometimes exclusively, on the results of
psychological testing.”).
9. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing how courts have given psychological tests such as the
MMPI-2 unsophisticated attention and fail to question the validity of these tests).
10. Robert M. Galatzer-Levy & Louis Krauss, Introduction to SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF CHILD
CUSTODY DECISIONS 2–6 (Robert M. Galatzer-Levy & Louis Krauss, eds., 1999); Dana R.
Baerger et al., A Methodology for Reviewing the Reliability and Relevance of Child Custody
Evaluations, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 35, 35 (2002); see James N. Bow & Francella A.
Quinnell, A Critical Review of Child Custody Reports, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 164, 165 (2002) (stating
that the expert’s report is usually taken at face value in court and not subject to crossexamination).
11. Baerger et al., supra note 10, at 35. The issue of admissibility of the evidence collected
during the evaluation process and the recommendations that come from the evaluations are
closely related to the problems that psychological tests pose in child-custody evaluations;
however, this Comment is limited to the analyzing the problems that certain psychological tests
pose rather than the issue of admissibility.
12. See Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Ill. 2011) (noting that section 603 of the
IMDMA mandates that the court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of
the child and shall consider all relevant factors in doing so); People ex rel. Morris v. Morris, 254
N.E.2d 478, 479 (Ill. 1969) (stating that the custody of a child should be awarded to any person
only where such action is consistent with the welfare and best interests of the child); In re
Marriage of Bhati and Singh, 920 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (discussing how a
determination of the best interests of the child cannot be reduced to a bright-line test and must be
made on a case-by-case basis); In re Marriage of Bailey, 474 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(“The trial court is directed to determine custody in accordance to the best interest of that
child . . . [i]n custody cases the trial court is vested with great discretion because it has a better
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what exactly is in the child’s best interest, including: (1) the likelihood
that the proposed move will enhance the general quality of life for both
the custodial parent and the children; (2) the motives of the custodial
parent in seeking the move; (3) the motives of the noncustodial parent
in resisting the removal; (4) the effect on the non-custodial parent’s
visitation rights; and (5) whether a realistic and reasonable visitation
schedule can be reached if removal is permitted.13 Section 604(b) of the
IMDMA grants courts the discretion to appoint a child-custody
evaluator, and its lack of guidelines for implementation, the use of
faulty psychological testing in the evaluations, and judges’ heavy
reliance on evaluators’ recommendations all cast doubt on whether the
resulting custody decision is in the best interests of the child, and raise
the question of whether there is a better way to ensure children’s best
interests are truly protected.14
This Comment provides background about the evolution of custody
standards that eventually transformed into the “best interest of the
child” standard, the statutory and common law “best interest of the
child” standard in Illinois, the difference between forensic and
therapeutic assessments, the different types of psychological
instruments, the use of certain psychological tests and how they are
administered, and the history of section 604(b) of the IMDMA.15 Part
II discusses how the Illinois statute is enforced in practice as well as
how other states approach using court-appointed evaluators in order to
provide a context in which to place Illinois’ law.16 Part III analyzes the
current state of the law in Illinois; the use of psychological tests by
604(b) evaluators and their biases, unreliability, and flawed
administration; and the direct effect these tests have on the outcome of

opportunity to observe the witnesses and to determine the best interests of the child.”); In re
Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (“In reviewing orders bearing
upon child custody, it is also the duty of this court to give constant and unswerving attention to
the best interests of the child.”); People ex rel. Rathbun v. Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1141
(1977) (“Under a petition for change of custody, the best interests and welfare of the child are of
primary concern to the court.”).
13. In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988); Winebright v. Winebright,
508 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); In re Custody of Anderson, 496 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986); Gallagher v. Gallagher, 376 N.E.2d 279, 281–82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
14. See generally Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 4–15 (opining that child-custody
evaluations do not serve the best interest of the child because of scientific concerns and arguing
for the implementation of a better system).
15. See infra Part I.A–F (providing context that will help understand why the use of CAIs are
inappropriate in a child-custody litigation context).
16. See infra Part II.A–C (discussing how Illinois courts apply the language of section 604(b)
when appointment of evaluator is contested by a party).
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the child-custody proceedings.17 Finally, Part IV discusses the need for
statutory guidelines of section 604(b) regarding the scope of an
evaluator’s evaluation, and ultimately proposes that the use of certain
psychological tests in child-custody proceedings, namely CAIs, in
custody proceedings should be abolished.18
I. BACKGROUND
The law governing child-custody evaluators is stated in section
604(b) of the IMDMA, and its lack of comprehensiveness leaves room
for courts to interpret its meaning and determine how it should be
enforced.19 Section 604(b) states:
The court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or
not employed by the court on a regular basis. The advice shall be in
writing and made available by the court to counsel. Counsel may
examine, as a witness, any professional personnel consulted by the
court, designated as a court’s witness. Professional personnel
consulted by the court are subject to subpoena for the purposes of
discovery, trial, or both. The court shall allocate the costs and fees of
those professional personnel between the parties based upon the
financial ability of each party and any other criteria the court considers
appropriate. Upon the request of any party or upon the court’s own
motion, the court may conduct a hearing as to the reasonableness of
those fees and costs.20

This Part begins by examining how child-custody standards have
evolved over time.21 Next, this Part provides background about the
“best interest of the child” standard in Illinois.22 This Part then
examines the difference between therapeutic and forensic

17. See infra Part III.A–C (analyzing the lack of guidelines that section 604(b) has, leaving
Illinois courts to apply it on an ad hoc basis, as well as the outcome-determinative nature of
flawed psychological testing used in child-custody litigation).
18. See infra Part IV.A–B (proposing that Illinois should adopt a rule similar to that of
California Rule of Court 5.225 and restrict psychological testing to tests that are meant to be used
in the legal system, rather than psychological tests designed to be used in a clinical therapeutic
setting).
19. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/604(b) (2014).
20. Id.; see In re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 4 N.E.3d 78, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)
(stating that section 604(b) of the IMDMA provides a mechanism for the court to appoint an
independent evaluator on custody and visitation issues, the purpose of the statute is to make the
information available to assist the circuit court, and the expert witness is appointed to protect the
interests of minor children regarding custody and visitation issues).
21. See infra Part I.A (discussing the evolution of child-custody standards that eventually
resulted in the “best interest of the child,” the prevailing standard today).
22. See infra Part I.B (discussing how the standard is codified in Illinois law and how courts
apply the standard).
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assessments,23 and compares certain psychological instruments.24 Next,
this Part provides background about the specifics of certain
psychological tests and their typical administrations.25 Finally, this Part
explores the legislative history of section 604(b), and how the statutory
language came to be what it is today.26
A. Evolution of Child-Custody Standards
In the early nineteenth century, English law resolved custody disputes
by placing the child in custody with the father.27 Only one factual
inquiry was made in these custody proceedings: whether one of the
claimants was the biological father of the child and was married to the
mother when the child was born.28 This rule derived from ancient
Rome where the “paterfamilias” was in control of all domestic and
public life.29 Children were seen as the property of their father, and this
resulted in fathers having total control over their children.30 All the
slaves, children, and grandchildren of everyone in the patriarch’s power
legally belonged to him.31
In colonial America, fathers were the economic head of the
household and were awarded custody of children because of their
economic importance.32 It was assumed that the father would be better

23. See infra Part I.C (discussing how therapeutic assessment occurs in the context of a
clinical setting, such as therapy, while forensic assessment occurs at the behest of the legal
system).
24. See infra Part I.D (discussing the difference between CAIs, forensic assessment
instruments (“FAIs”), and forensically relevant instruments (“FRIs”)).
25. See infra Part I.E (discussing the differences between the MMPI-2, MCMI, and Rorschach
tests, and how they are typically administered).
26. See infra Part I.F (discussing how the language of section 604(b) has developed over time,
and whether any changes have been significant).
27. Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 234 (1975); see King v. DeManneville, 102
Eng. Rep. 1054, 1055 (K.B. 1804) (stating that the father is entitled by law to the custody of his
child).
28. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 234. A husband’s cruelty, violence, or infidelity were not
enough to justify granting custody to the wife, even if the father was in jail at the time. See
generally King v. Greenhill, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836); Ex parte Skinner, 27 Rev. R. 710
(C.P. 1824).
29. THOMAS H. MURRAY, THE WORTH OF A CHILD 53 (1996); Steven N. Peskind,
Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect but
Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 452 (2005).
30. Peskind, supra note 29, at 452.
31. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 53.
32. Mary Ann Mason & Ann Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Custody? Read My Lips: Trends in
Judicial Decision-Making in Custody Disputes—1920, 1960, 1990, and 1995, 31 FAM. L.Q. 215,
219 (1997); Mary Ann Mason, Masters and Servants: The American Colonial Model of Child
Custody and Control, 2 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS. 317, 319 (1994); Peskind, supra note 29, at
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able to supervise the children because he was in control of apprentices
and other laborers in his home.33 This patriarchal preference began to
erode in Revolutionary America.34
The American Revolution
transformed the idea of the family into a collection of individuals, each
with his or her own rights, as opposed to the earlier idea of a unit
headed by the patriarch.35
By the end of the eighteenth century, children were no longer seen as
their fathers’ economic tools and the focus shifted into a consideration
of children’s needs and an inquiry into which parent would be better
able to provide for those needs.36 This shift in focus implicitly
recognized the importance of separating the children’s needs from their
parents’ needs.37
Nineteenth-century American law continued to reject the idea of
absolute paternal preference.38 In nineteenth-century America, the
family still had a patriarch as its head, and the law still considered
women and children to be inferior, but judges increasingly began to
intervene in family matters in order to protect individual family
members’ interests.39 Many jurisdictions were authorized to grant
custody to either the husband or wife in a custody proceeding.40
Despite some statutes expressing a preference for paternal custody, a
fault-based rule eventually emerged: “The children will be best taken
care of and instructed by the innocent party.”41
452; see Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1154
(stating that the common-law doctrine gave virtually absolute custody of any child to the father).
33. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 219; Peskind, supra note 29, at 452; Teitelbaum, supra
note 32, at 1154.
34. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 54; Peskind, supra note 29, at 452.
35. Peskind, supra note 29, at 452; see MURRAY, supra note 29, at 54 (commenting that the
American Revolution, with its “fierce opposition to patriarchy,” began a transformation: the
family became a collectivity of individuals with their own rights and interests as opposed to an
“organic whole with the patriarch as its head”).
36. Peskind, supra note 29, at 454.
37. Id.
38. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 234; Peskind, supra note 29, at 452. During the course of the
nineteenth century, the judiciary began to re-balance spouses’ rights in determining custody. See
generally Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody,
Adoption, and the Courts 1796–1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979) (examining the evolution
of American family law from 1796 through 1851).
39. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 54.
40. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 234. Many earlier cases demonstrate that the mother as well
as the father could claim custody of the children. See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 23 Iowa 433, 446
(1867); Cook v. Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. 639 (N.Y. 1846).
41. J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 518, 520 (1852);
Mnookin, supra note 27, at 234; Bernadette Weaver-Catalana, Comment, The Battle for Baby
Jessica: A Conflict of Best Interests, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 583, 613 (1995). See generally A. LLOYD,
LAW OF DIVORCE 40–145 (1887) (discussing how courts were authorized to grant custody to

NATHAN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/27/2015 1:44 PM

Mixing Oil & Water

873

During the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, the
wife typically filed for divorce, and she was required to prove that her
husband was at fault in order to prevail in a custody proceeding.42
Given this social convention, courts began to award custody to the
mother more often than the father.43
Gradually during the twentieth century, the law evolved into favoring
a maternal preference for child custody.44 During this period, women
began to obtain more social and economic power, their education levels
increased, and society began to view women as having “maternal
instincts” which were thought to make them better suited to care for
children than men.45 The courts began to interpret this movement as
giving the mother a substantial preference, especially if the children
involved were young.46 This maternal preference rule, also known as
the “tender years doctrine,” became incorporated into statutes and
common law.47 The law began to view women as having better morals
and being better able to nurture and raise children than men.48 This
either the mother or father).
42. Peskind, supra note 29, at 453–54.
43. Id.; Mnookin, supra note 27, at 235.
44. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 219; Peskind, supra note 29, at 454; see Andre P.
Derdeyn, Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspectives, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1369,
1370–71 (1976) (noting that the presumption for custodial maternal preference corresponded with
the rise in women’s rights and changes in how society perceived children’s needs).
45. Peskind, supra note 29, at 454; see Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220.
As a general rule a father is entitled to the custody of his minor children; but when the
parents live apart under a voluntary separation, and the father has left an infant child in
the custody of its mother, such custody will not be transferred to the father . . . when
the infant is of tender age, and of a delicate and sickly habit, peculiarly requiring a
mother’s care and attention; and especially will not an order for such transfer be made
where the qualifications of the father for the proper discharge of the parental office are
not equal to those of the mother.
Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64, 64 (N.Y. 1840).
46. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 235; Peskind, supra note 29, at 454; see Ullman v. Ullman,
135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1083 (1926) (stating that a child at tender age is entitled to have the care, love
and discipline that only a good and devoted mother can usually give).
47. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 235; Peskind, supra note 29, at 454; see Miner v. Miner 11 Ill.
43, 50 (1849) (affirming an order giving custody of a seven-year-old girl to her mother over the
objection of the father, and basing its holding on the “tender care which nature requires, and
which it is the peculiar province of a mother to supply”); People ex rel. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 91
App. Div. 322, 325 (N.Y. 1904) (stating that courts do not hesitate to award custody of young
infants to the wife “as against the paramount right of the husband where the wife has shown
herself to be the proper person”); Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 219 (stating that the relevant
factors for determining the best interests of the child included the desires of the parents, the
wishes of the child, the child’s needs, any special mental or physical conditions, the child’s sex
and age, parental fitness, the moral fortitude of the parents, and a presumption in favor of the
mother if the children were young).
48. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220; see MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 49–84 (1994) (stating that this “cult of motherhood” focused
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maternal presumption of child custody remained intact for the first sixty
years of the twentieth century.49
In the mid-twentieth century, the rules affecting child custody
transformed.50 Society’s attitudes toward children and families changed
as a result of the feminist movement and the increasing presence of the
federal government in family law matters.51 Feminism promoted
theories of equal rights between men and women, and this contributed
largely to the obviation of the maternal custodial preference.52
Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s divorce rates were rising, women’s
traditional roles were challenged, and men began claiming sex
discrimination in custody awards.53 As a result of this turmoil, most
states abandoned the maternal preference for custody and sought a more
gender-neutral standard.54 State legislatures drafted statutes for judges
to apply the “best interest of the child” standard, and this standard
became the new gender-neutral standard for courts to apply in childcustody proceedings.55
on the superior nurturing and moral qualities of women that better suited them for raising
children, as opposed to men, and the welfare of the child was no longer clearly served best by the
father).
49. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220.
50. Michael Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the United States
1950–2000, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND 3, 4
(Sanford N. Katz et al., eds., 2000); Peskind, supra note 29, at 455.
51. Grossberg, supra note 50, at 4.
52. Peskind, supra note 29, at 455. The irony is that feminism promoted theories of equal
rights between men and women, but this led to getting rid of a presumption that favored women.
Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220.
53. Grossberg, supra note 50, at 8.
54. Id.; Arlene Skolnick, Solomon’s Children: The New Biologism, Psychological
Parenthood, Attachment Theory, and the Best Interest Standard, in ALL OUR FAMILIES, NEW
POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY 242–43 (Mary Ann Mason et al., eds., 1998); see Mason &
Quirk, supra note 32, at 220 (stating that the presumption that the interests of a child during his or
her “tender years” is best served by maternal custody was legally abolished and demoted to a
“factor to be considered” in nearly all states between 1960 and 1990). By 1982, the only
remaining states that gave mothers a custodial preference over fathers during the child’s tender
years were Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Utah, and Virginia. Jeff
Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1,
11 (1984).
55. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220–21. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
defined the child’s best interests as taking into account the following factors:
(1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the
child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parent or parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the
child’s best interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community;
and (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998). The Act further notes that
“[t]he court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child.” Id.
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B. The Best Interest of the Child Standard in Illinois
The “best interest of the child” standard is codified in section 602 of
the IMDMA, and it delineates all relevant factors that the court must
consider in determining custody based on the best interests of the child,
including:
(1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the
wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings
and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school and
community; (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved; (6) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by
the child’s potential custodian, whether directed against the child or
directed against another person; (7) the occurrence of ongoing or
repeated abuse as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act of 1986, whether directed against the child or directed
against another person; (8) the willingness and ability of each parent
to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between
the other parent and the child; [and] (9) whether one of the parents is a
sex offender[.]”56

The “best interest of the child” standard does not support any legal
presumptions that favor a particular sex, but rather aims to resolve
custody disputes in a gender-neutral manner.57 A court must consider
many different factors and circumstances in order to ensure that the
children’s welfare and best interests are protected.58 Inherent in
applying this standard is the requirement that courts predict future
conditions that may affect a child’s welfare.59 Resolving a custody
dispute by applying this standard involves evaluating the attitudes,
dispositions, capacities, and shortcomings of each parent, and the
56. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2014).
57. Peskind, supra note 29, at 455. In attempts to come to a more gender-neutral standard,
many legislatures suggested joint custody, which gave men and women equal rights, or a primary
caretaker preference, which quantified time spent with the child in order to decide who obtains
custody. Despite these efforts, most states maintained the best interest standard. Mason & Quirk,
supra note 32, at 221.
58. Peskind, supra note 29, at 455; see In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1222 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (stating that each situation is different and the general principles exist for the trial
and reviewing court to reach a decision designed to protect children’s best interests).
59. Peskind, supra note 29, at 460.
Adjudication usually requires the determination of past acts and facts, not a prediction
of future events. Applying the best-interests standard requires an individualized
prediction: with whom will this child be better off in the years to come? Proof of what
happened in the past is relevant only insofar as it enables the court to decide what is
likely to happen in the future.
Mnookin, supra note 27, at 251.
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inquiry focuses on the kind of person each parent is and what the child
is like.60
Despite this seemingly commendable nature of the standard’s goals
and objectives, courts have faced many challenges in applying it.61
Nonetheless, “best interest of the child” remains the favored standard
for child-custody proceedings.62
C. Therapeutic v. Forensic Assessment
Section 604(b) of the IMDMA gives the court the discretion to
appoint an evaluator to help the court come to a conclusion regarding
custody.63 When a court appoints an evaluator in child-custody
proceedings, the evaluators are often psychologists or other mentalhealth experts who provide evaluations in order to ascertain what, in
fact, is the best interest of the child.64 As part of their evaluations, these
evaluators often conduct psychological tests to assess the parents,
guardians, and children.65
In order to understand why using psychological examinations in
child-custody proceedings is problematic, it is important to understand
the distinction between therapeutic assessments, which occur at the
request and on behalf of the patient in a clinical setting,66 and forensic

60. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 251.
61. Peskind, supra note 29, at 455. The best interest standard applies uniquely in each
situation because each individual child and family is unique. See Mnookin, supra note 27, at 227
(“Custody law today reflects a complicated and chaotic multiplicity of such factors as the
doctrinal thread invoked, the identity of the disputants, their prior relationship to the child, and
the setting from which the dispute arose.”).
62. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 221; see In re Marriage of Turk, 12 N.E.3d 40, 45 (Ill.
2014) (stating that a range of considerations may affect the court’s assessment of custody with the
ultimate objective of serving the best interest of the child).
63. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (2014).
64. Steven K. Erickson et al., A Critical Examination of the Suitability and Limitations of
Psychological Tests in Family Court, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 157, 158 (2007); see Daniel W. Shuman,
What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say about the “Best Interests of the
Child”? An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551,
565–66 (1997) (stating that the best interests standard assumes that mental-health professionals
have a sound basis for determining the best child-custody arrangements and impliedly, that
lawyers and judges do not).
65. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 157; see Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Mental Health
Experts in Custody Decisions: Science, Psychological Tests, and Clinical Judgment, 36 FAM.
L.Q. 135, 142 (2002) (opining that given the risk of error associated with unstructured clinical
decision-making, it is not surprising that mental-health professionals conducting custody
evaluations have resorted to using psychological tests); see also Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C.
Ackerman, Child Custody Evaluation Practices: A 1996 Survey of Psychologists, 30 FAM. L.Q.
565, 573 (1996) (stating that when a child-custody evaluation is conducted by a psychologist, the
MMPI-2 is often used as part of the evaluation process).
66. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 43.
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assessments, which occur at the behest of the legal system.67 These two
types of assessments differ in a number of aspects, particularly the
identity of the client, the focus and scope of the examination, the
response style and involvement of the client, and the pace of the
evaluation.68 Assessment in a child-custody proceeding is always a
forensic evaluation, because the goal is not to diagnose or treat the
examinee, but rather to answer legal questions and analyze the effect the
evaluation should have on the litigation.69
Therapeutic assessments occur at the request and on behalf of a
patient as a function of a clinical environment, such as a personality test
administered in a therapy session.70 In this type of setting, evaluators
discuss with their patients broad issues such as diagnosis, personality
functioning, and treatment to change behavior.71 The treating clinician
is focused on understanding the client’s subjective point of view of the
issue or situation,72 and the client typically is voluntarily seeking an
assessment rather than at the request of a third party.73 Clients have
great autonomy and input regarding the objectives and procedures of
their assessment, and the therapist and client seek to develop a common
agenda based on the client’s needs.74
Therapeutic assessment
67. Id.
68. Id. at 44; see Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2011) (finding that the 604(b) report
was not privileged under the Confidentiality Act because the parties were interviewed in the
context of child-custody proceedings, not a therapeutic setting where they were receiving mentalhealth services). See generally Stuart Greenberg & Daniel Shuman, Irreconcilable Conflict
Between Therapeutic and Forensic Roles, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 50, 54 (1997)
(comprehensively discussing the ten major differences between therapeutic and forensic
relationships).
69. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 45 (discussing that the most obvious difference
between a forensic and therapeutic evaluation is that the focus of forensic evaluations is dictated
by a legal system that is only occasionally interested in information about treatment); Kirk
Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation: Critically Assessing Mental Health Experts and
Psychological Tests, 29 FAM. L.Q. 63, 67 (1995) [hereinafter Heilbrun, Child Custody
Evaluation] (stating that when a mental-health professional is asked by a judge to perform an
evaluation for the purpose of a legal proceeding, the mental-health professional assumes a
forensic role in that case).
70. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 43; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 54
(stating that the therapist is answerable to the client, who decides whether or not to uses the
therapist’s services).
71. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44.
72. Id. at 45. This is because the goal of therapeutic assessment is to diagnose issues and
provide treatment, which varies from person to person.
73. Id. at 44. Therapeutic assessment is obviously not voluntary in the case of someone being
forced to go to court-ordered therapy, but in the majority of circumstances, individuals seek
therapy because they are looking to improve some aspect of their mental health and want to seek
help.
74. Id.; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 54 (stating that the therapist is usually
supportive, accepting, and empathic).
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emphasizes caring, trust, and empathic understanding,75 and the
evaluations typically proceed at a leisurely pace.76
In contrast, forensic evaluations address narrowly defined, nonclinical events, and evaluators minimally address clinical issues such as
treatment or diagnosis.77 In a forensic examination setting, the forensic
examiner is concerned with assisting a third party—such as an attorney,
court, or employer—by providing these parties with information about
the examinee that it might not otherwise have.78 People undergoing a
forensic evaluation in the context of a legal issue almost always do so at
the request of a third party such as a judge or attorney.79 Statutes or
common-law tests that are relevant to the legal issue rather than the
examinee, determine the objectives in forensic evaluations.80 The threat
of conscious and intentional distortion of information is substantially
greater in the forensic, rather than therapeutic, context.81 A forensic
evaluator is more likely than a therapist to be confronted with resistant
and uncooperative individuals; therefore, the coerced nature of the
evaluation process and the importance of its outcome threatens the
validity by way of possible misrepresentation.82 Further, the forensic
examiners may not communicate to their examinees the idea that they
are playing a “helping” role.83 There is greater emotional distance
between the forensic clinician and the client, and factors such as court
schedules and limited resources limit opportunities for contact between
them.84 A forensic evaluation should address the threshold issues,
75. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44. See generally Nicholas Hobbs, Sources of Gain in
Psychotherapy, 17 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741 (1962) (noting that empathic understanding by the
therapist is one general source of gain in therapy).
76. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44. In therapeutic contexts, diagnoses may be
reconsidered during the course of treatment and revised after the initial interviews are conducted.
77. Id. at 44; see id. at 45 (“It is neither proper nor necessary to subvert the forensic
assessment process with a misplaced emphasis on diagnostic and treatment concerns.”).
78. Id. at 44; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 54 (stating that the forensic
evaluator is ultimately answerable to the attorney or court in the case of a court-appointed expert,
who decides whether to use the evaluator’s services).
79. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 55
(stating that in the context of a forensic evaluation, the court or attorney retains the forensic
evaluator for litigation).
80. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 55
(stating that the forensic evaluator must know the law as it relates to the assessment of the
particular impairment claimed).
81. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 46.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 44; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 54 (stating that forensic evaluators
are usually neutral and objective, and their task is to remain dispassionate as to the psycholegal
issues being evaluated).
84. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44; Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
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which are typically a description of relevant mental functioning, the
relevant legal capacity, and the relationship between the two.85
D. Psychological Instruments
Testing has become a significant aspect of forensic evaluation for
many reasons, especially because it offers a scientific dimension and
objectivity to opinions, which lawyers and judges favor.86
Psychological testing instruments can be broken into three categories:
CAIs, forensically relevant instruments (“FRIs”), and forensic
assessment instruments (“FAIs”).87 The most common psychological
instruments are CAIs.88 These are psychological tests that were initially
developed for use in assessment, diagnosis, and treatment planning in
the context of therapy.89 CAIs are the least likely of the three types of
psychological instruments to be of direct help in forensic evaluations,
because they assess general psychological constructs such as
depression, intelligence, and anxiety that are too far removed from the
issues courts consider in custody disputes.90
FRIs assess clinical constructs that are most relevant to the evaluation
of people involved in the legal system, such as psychopathy and
violence risk.91 They are less frequently used by mental-health
professionals and tend to be less thoroughly researched.92
FAIs are specifically designed to be used in the legal system and to
assess “psycholegal” capacities such as competence to stand trial or the
ability to handle certain legal matters, such as an estate.93 In the case of

85. Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, at 67.
86. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 47; David Brodzinsky, On the Use and Misuse of
Psychological Testing in Child Custody Evaluations, 24 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 213, 216
(1993).
87. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 47–48. See generally THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING
COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 31–53 (2d ed. 1986) (introducing
the concept of FAIs).
88. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48. This should not be surprising considering therapeutic
assessments are more common than forensic assessments, and CAIs are used in therapeutic
assessments to measure clinical constructs such as personality and depression.
89. Id.
90. Id. But cf. FORENSIC USES OF CLINICAL ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS (Robert P. Archer
ed., 1st ed. 2006) (providing a basis to understand the appropriate uses and limitations of CAIs in
forensic contexts).
91. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48.
92. See id. (stating that FRIs that are proven valid provide a good balance between clinical
confidence and legal relevance).
93. Id.; see GRISSO, supra note 87, at 34 (“A forensic assessment instrument is an operational
definition of a legally relevant functional ability concept. Therefore, FAIs are intended to provide
data that can manage the conceptual gap between legal constructs and psychological
constructs.”); Kirk Heilbrun, The Role of Psychological Testing in Forensic Assessment, 16 LAW
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child custody, the legal competency in question is parental competency,
or which parental situation represents the best prospects for the child’s
best interests.94 The development of FAIs suggests that mental-health
professionals are aware that CAIs have limited relevance in forensic
contexts.95
FAIs offer several benefits for forensic assessments.96 They provide
the examiner with structure and make clear what it is that the law wants
to know about human capacities, because these capacities are part of the
FAI structure.97 They can help the examiner in logically arriving at data
and inferences that are consistent with the purpose of forensic
assessments: to make legally relevant assessments for legal
competencies—such as parental competency.98 Further, FAI data that
are valid on their face in relation to the legal competency construct
would require a smaller inferential leap than when an expert attempts to
relate psychiatric symptoms or personality traits99 to the legal
competency construct at issue in the litigation.100
E. Psychological Tests and How They Are Administered
Before discussing commonly used psychological tests in childcustody proceedings, it is necessary to understand certain psychological
terms, namely validity, reliability, and relevance. The concepts of
validity and reliability are two fundamental psychometric properties of
psychological tests that describe the scientific characteristics of a test.101
The validity of a test is the degree to which it measures what it purports

& HUM. BEHAV. 257, 257 (1992) [hereinafter Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing] (stating in
a footnote that forensic assessment refers to information produced by mental-health experts
intended for application to legal issues).
94. GRISSO, supra note 87, at 6.
95. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48; see GRISSO, supra note 87, at 31 (discussing how the
use of these CAIs will not satisfy courts’ needs for relevant and credible information about the
examinee’s functional abilities related to the relevant legal competency at issue).
96. Id. at 35. But see id. at 38 (discussing the potential for misuse and misinterpretation of
FAIs and the need to approach them with caution and scrutiny).
97. Id.
98. Id.; see MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 52 (stating that some FAIs are described as
interview guides that provide a list of topics to help clinicians structure their interviews around
appropriate legal issues).
99. Psychiatric symptoms or general personality traits are assessed by CAI, which require an
expert or evaluator to make an inference as to what the specific symptom or trait says about the
legal competency construct at issue.
100. GRISSO, supra note 87, at 35; see MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 53 (stating that when
FAIs are used, the chain of inferences from test behavior to legal criterion is typically reduced).
101. David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing: Considerations Following
Daubert, Kumho, and Joiner, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 199, 200 (2003).
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to measure.102 It describes the accuracy of a test and the degree to
which it provides a true measurement of whatever is being assessed.103
Another way of thinking about validity is by posing the question: “Are
we measuring what we think we are measuring?”104 Reliability relates
to the consistency or stability of the test results.105 It provides
information about whether a test provides similar results after it is
repeated over time or across situations.106
A test must be scientifically reliable to be scientifically valid;
however, a test does not have to be scientifically valid to be
scientifically reliable.107 Both reliability and validity are vital in
assessing whether or not a test is accurate, and they relate to each other
because they provide meaningful insight about the truthfulness and
consistency of the test results.108 Reliability is a part of what makes a
test valid, because if a test cannot consistently yield the same results,
then it is unlikely that the test is conveying useful information.109
While the two concepts are related, it is possible for a test to have a high
level of reliability and a low level of validity, and vice versa.110 For
example, a test could yield the same results each time it is repeated, thus
having a high level of reliability, but it could be a completely inaccurate
way of measuring what is trying to be measured, thus having a low level
of validity.111
Not all tests are valid for measuring aspects of emotion, cognition, or
102. Id.; Saul McLeod, What is Validity?, SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGY (2013), http://www.simply
psychology.org/validity.html.
103. Medoff, supra note 101, at 200; McLeod, supra note 102.
104. Dana R. Baerger et al., A Methodology for Reviewing the Reliability and Relevance of
Child Custody Evaluations, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 35, 47 (2002).
105. Medoff, supra note 101, at 200; Saul McLeod, What is Reliability?, SIMPLY
PSYCHOLOGY (2013), http://www.simplypsychology.org/reliability.html.
106. Medoff, supra note 101, at 200; see McLeod, supra note 105 (stating that if research
findings yield consistent results, they are reliable).
107. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 47. A common-sense example of the relationship
between validity and reliability is the traditional accuracy v. precision analogy in target practice.
You can be precise but not accurate (every arrow hits the same spot, but that spot is off to the side
of the bull’s-eye), accurate but not precise (you always hit around the bull’s-eye, but never the
same spot twice), or both accurate and precise (all bull’s-eyes).
108. Medoff, supra note 101, at 200–01.
109. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 47.
110. Medoff, supra note 101, at 201; see Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra note
93, at 265 (stating that the lower the reliability of a given test, the lower the limit on the validity
of the construct being measured, and it should come as no surprise that tests with reliability
coefficients below .80 have been criticized for containing excessive error variance and thus,
poorer validity).
111. Medoff, supra note 101, at 201. In this situation, even though there is a high level of
reliability, the test is not accurate because it has a low level of validity. A test is meaningless if it
yields the same results each time but the test is not measuring what it is supposed to measure.

NATHAN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

882

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/27/2015 1:44 PM

[Vol. 46

personality functioning.112 Relevance refers to the extent to which a
test is valid for the purpose for which it is used.113 A psychological test
can be both reliable and valid, but it can also lack relevance if used in
an inappropriate context.114 In deciding whether to administer a test in
either a therapeutic or forensic context, the primary factor considered
should be the degree to which the results will inform the decision that
has to be made in the specific instance.115 Therefore, forensic
examiners should be most concerned with the scientific research that
links certain test results to relevant legal outcomes.116 If thorough
research shows a relationship between the results of a certain test and a
construct that is related to legally relevant behaviors, then
administration of that test may be warranted.117 However, if a test only
provides information about diagnosis or a general level of functioning
and does not speak to legally relevant conclusions, then speculating
about legally relevant behavior is not warranted and the clinician should
inquire about a more direct way of addressing the issue.118
1. Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”) is
the most widely used objective personality inventory in the world,119 as
well as the most frequently used objective adult personality test in
family court evaluations.120 It was originally developed to screen for
112. Id.
113. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 47.
Psychological tests may simply be irrelevant when clinicians attempt to use them in a
straightforward fashion to measure legal concepts. The translation between the results
of a test developed to measure a psychological construct such as “impulsivity” or
“depression,” and the outcome on a legal dimension such as “ability to assist counsel in
one’s own defense,” must be justified by the relevance of that psychological construct
to the legal construct.
Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra note 93, at 265 (internal citations omitted).
114. See Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 47 (“A psychological test can be reliable and valid,
and still lack relevance in the context of a [child-custody evaluation] because it is not valid for the
purpose of determining parenting capacity.”).
115. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 50.
116. Id.; Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra note 93, at 265.
117. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 50.
118. Id.
119. ALAN F. FRIEDMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT WITH THE MMPI-2, at 1
(2001). The widespread use of the MMPI-2 is attributable to many factors including its simplicity
of scoring and administration, an objective response format important for research designs, a
large item pool, many useful applications, and thousands of empirically established correlates.
120. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 13; Shuman, supra note 65, at 144; see Michaela
C. Heinze & Thomas Grisso, Review of Instruments Assessing Parenting Competencies Used in
Child Custody Evaluations, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 293, 294–95 (1996) (explaining how the most
frequently used test to identify parenting capacity was the Ackerman-Schoendorf Scales for
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severe psychopathology like depression, paranoia, and schizophrenia.121
A 1986 national survey reported that about seventy percent of custody
evaluators used the MMPI in their custody evaluations,122 and a 1997
national survey reported that ninety-two percent of clinicians used the
MMPI in their evaluations.123 A 2005 national study analyzing the
administration, scoring, and interpretation of the MMPI-2 in childcustody evaluations found that ninety-eight percent of child-custody
evaluators used the MMPI-2 in their evaluations.124
The MMPI-2 is designed to make it difficult for people to fake their
answers, deny their problems, or give a particular impression.125 The
test is based on empirical research rather than a clinician’s assumptions
on what certain answers reveal about a particular personality trait.126
The test is a self-report measure of the test-taker’s psychological state
that entails 567 true-or-false items.127
The MMPI-2 has ten main clinical scales and three main validity
scales.128 Eight of the clinical scales address psychopathology such as
depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder, while two of the
clinical scales address personality traits such as anger and
hypochondriasis.129 The three validity scales are designed to assess
whether the subject’s responses are an accurate representation of the

Parent Evaluation of Custody (“ASPECT”), which includes having parents complete the MMPI-2
in addition to several other assessment steps).
121. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145; see infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing why using a test
originally designed to screen for such psychopathologies is a problem in the context of measuring
the “best interest of the child”).
122. William G. Keilin & Larry J. Bloom, Child Custody Evaluation Practices: A Survey of
Experienced Professionals, 17 PROF. PSYCHOL. RESP. & PRACT. 338, 341 tbl.3 (1986); Joseph T.
McCann et al., The MCMI-III in Child Custody Evaluations: A Normative Study, 1 J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOL. PRAC. 27, 29 (2001).
123. Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C. Ackerman, Custody Evaluation Practices: A Survey of
Experienced Professionals (Revisited), 28 PROF. PSYCHOL. RESP. & PRACT. 137, 140 (1997);
McCann et al., supra note 122, at 29.
124. James N. Bow et al., An Analysis of Administration, Scoring, and Interpretation of the
MMPI-2 and MCMI-II/II in Child Custody Evaluations, 2 J. CHILD. CUSTODY 1, 8 (2005).
125. Mike Drayton, The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2), 59
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 135, 135 (2009).
126. Id.
127. Id.; see MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48 (stating that the MMPI-2 consists of
objectively scored items and produce protocols that have been related to global symptom patterns,
likely diagnoses, and characteristics of general personality functioning and behavior).
128. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145; see FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 2–3 (the three
validity scales include: Lie (L), Infrequency (F), and Correction (K). The ten clinical scales
include: Hypochondriasis (Hs), Depression (D), Hysteria (Hy), Psychopathic Deviate (Pd),
Masculinity–Femininity (Mf), Paranoia (Pa), Psychasthenia (Pt), Schizophrenia (Sc), Hypomania
(Ma), and Social Introversion (Si)).
129. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145.
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psychopathology being tested and the subject’s approach to the
testing.130
However, the MMPI-2 is not intended for use with adolescents.131
The MMPI-2 committee recognized that adult norms would not apply to
an adolescent form, and a separate revision of the test was conducted for
the sole purpose of developing an adolescent instrument derived from
the MMPI-2.132 This revision was named the MMPI-A (Adolescent).133
2. Rorschach Inkblot Technique
The Rorschach Inkblot Technique (“Rorschach”) is the second most
frequently used test in child-custody evaluations and the most
frequently used projective test (as opposed to “objective” in the case of
the MMPI) in child-custody evaluations.134 The test consists of ten
ambiguous inkblot drawings that are individually shown to a test
subject, who is then asked to explain or describe what he or she sees.135
The test administrator then records the responses and asks follow-up
questions.136
The theory behind projective tests is that test subjects will
unknowingly project aspects of their emotional lives, involving
unconscious material, in an unstructured test.137 How a subject
constructs the stimulus is assumed to project the subject’s psychological
functioning and personality.138
3. Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (“MCMI”) is the second
130. Erickson, supra note 64, at 161; see FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 3 (stating that
the validity scales were developed in order to assist in recognizing test records produced by
uncooperative or deceptive participants with various test-taking attitudes or participants who had
a difficult time understanding or reading the test items).
131. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 9.
132. Id.; R. P. Archer, Use of the MMPI with Adolescents: A Review of Salient Issues, 4
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 241, 241–51 (1984).
133. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 9. The MMPI-A was released in 1992 and is
intended for adolescents between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, although if an individual
possesses the necessary reading level and comprehension abilities but less than fourteen years
old, it can still be used on that individual. Because the adolescent norms include eighteen-yearolds, a clinician who is testing an eighteen-year-old could use either the MMPI-A or the MMPI-2.
134. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 559; Ackerman & Ackerman, supra note 123, at 140;
Keilin & Bloom, supra note 122, at 341 tbl. 3.
135. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 164; Shuman, supra note 65, at 148.
136. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 164; Shuman, supra note 65, at 148.
137. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 49 (“By ‘projecting’ their own perceptions and
interpretations onto these ambiguous stimuli, clients reveal something about the ways in which
they view and comprehend their environment.”).
138. MELTON ET AL. supra note 7, at 49; Shuman, supra note 65, at 148.
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most frequently used objective personality test in child-custody
litigation.139 While a 1997 national study found that only about thirtyfour percent of child-custody evaluators utilized the MCMI with
adults,140 a 2005 national study found that the use of the MCMI by
child-custody evaluators in their evaluations increased to sixty-three
percent.141 The test was designed for use with individuals who
evidence problematic emotional and interpersonal symptoms, who are
undergoing professional psychotherapy, or who are undergoing a
psychodiagnostic evaluation.142
The MCMI is a paper-and-pencil test that consists of 175 true-orfalse items that assess personality disorders based on Theodore Millon’s
theory of personality and psychopathology.143 It provides a measure of
twenty-four personality disorders and clinical syndromes for adults
undergoing psychological assessment or treatment and assists clinicians
in diagnosing psychiatric conditions and developing treatments that take
into account the subject’s personality style and coping behavior.144 The
test is often given in a clinical setting when questions arise over a
specific diagnosis or personality characteristics that are affecting the
patient’s ability to cope with his or her life.145
F. History of Section 604(b)
In 1977, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the IMDMA,146
which borrowed from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.147 The

139. Ackerman & Ackerman, supra note 123, at 140; Shuman, supra note 65, at 146.
140. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 29.
141. Bow et al., supra note 124, at 12.
142. Jane Framingham, Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-III), PSYCH CENTRAL,
http://psychcentral.com/lib/millon-clinical-multiaxial-inventory-mcmi-iii/0006106 (last visited
Apr. 26, 2015).
143. Shuman, supra note 65, at 146. See generally THEODORE MILLON, CLINICAL MANUAL
FOR THE MCMI-II (1987); James N. Bow et al., MMPI-2 and MCMI-III in Forensic Evaluations:
A Survey of Psychologists, 10 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 37, 38 (2010) (stating that unlike the
MMPI-2, the MMCI is a criterion-referenced test and does not assume a normal curve of traits or
disorders and that the MCMI’s items correspond closely with criteria from the fourth edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders).
144. Framingham, supra note 142; see Bow et al., supra note 143, at 39 (stating that unlike
the MMPI-2, the MMCI is a criterion-referenced test and does not assume a normal curve of traits
or disorders).
145. Framingham, supra note 142.
146. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101–802 (1977).
147. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was an attempt by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to make marriage and divorce laws more uniform and has
had a huge impact on marriage and divorce laws in all states. Marriage and Divorce Act, Model
Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Marriage
%20and%20Divorce%20Act,%20Model (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
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custody provisions of the IMDMA codified Illinois custody law and set
the statutory standards for multiple facets of child-custody proceedings
in divorce cases.148
Section 604 of the IMDMA derives from section 404 of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, which states in a comment: “This section . . .
[is] designed to permit the court to make custodial and visitation
decisions as informally and non-contentiously as possible, based on as
much relevant information as can be secured, while preserving a fair
hearing for all interested parties.”149 From 1992 to 2011, section 604(b)
stated:
The court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or
not employed by the court on a regular basis. The advice given shall
be in writing and made available by the court to counsel. Counsel
may examine, as a witness, any professional personnel consulted by
the court, designated as a court’s witness.150

Yet, in 2011, the statute was amended to add the following language:
Professional personnel consulted by the court are subject to subpoena
for the purposes of discovery, trial, or both. The court shall allocate
the costs and fees of those professional personnel between the parties
based upon the financial ability of each party and any other criteria the
court considers appropriate. Upon the request of any party or upon the
court’s own motion, the court may conduct a hearing as to the
reasonableness of those fees and costs.151

This amendment essentially added a provision addressing how the
costs and fees should be allocated and did nothing to affect the relevant
part of section 604(b). The 2011 amendment remains in place today,
and section 604(b) as a whole remains functionally the same.152
II. DISCUSSION
This Part discusses how section 604(b) has been enforced in Illinois
courts, and how other states have crafted their related statutes.153
Comparing Illinois to California and Pennsylvania illustrates how
different states address the child-custody evaluation process, and
provides a scale with California being the most comprehensive,
Pennsylvania being less comprehensive, and Illinois being the least
148. John H. Doll, The Child Custody Provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 671, 672 (1980).
149. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 404, 9A U.L.A. 381, cmt. (1998).
150. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604 (2010).
151. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604 (2011).
152. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604 (West 2014).
153. See infra Part II.A–C (discussing the enforcement of section 604(b) and California’s
codification of an evidentiary rule governing disputed child-custody suits).
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comprehensive.154
A. The Current State of the Law: Enforcement of Section 604(b)
In practice, Illinois courts may or may not decide to appoint an
evaluator, and if they choose to do so, they may or may not decide to
follow the evaluator’s recommendations, because section 604(b) uses
extremely vague language and provides virtually no guidance as to how
courts should apply it.155 When a court appoints a 604(b) evaluator and
a party to the litigation opposes the evaluator’s testimony or evaluation,
the court tends to resolve the issue in most cases by acknowledging its
discretion in being able to appoint an evaluator and choose whether or
not to follow the evaluator’s recommendations, and denying any
objections the party claims.156 The lack of statutory guidance leaves
much room for courts to reject a party’s argument that the court erred in
either accepting or rejecting an evaluator’s recommendation, or
appointing an evaluator at all.157 The statute gives courts the option to
154. Id.
155. The majority of cases deal with issues about a party opposing the appointment of an
evaluator, or failing to adopt or not adopt the recommendation, rather than a party arguing that the
court erred in failing to appoint an evaluator.
156. See generally Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2011) (finding that the 604(b) report
may only be disclosed to the court, counsel, and parties in the particular proceeding after the wife
alleged violations by disseminating the information obtained by the 604(b) evaluator); In re
Marriage of Lonvick, 995 N.E.2d 1007, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (finding that 604(b) allows a
trial court to seek advice in making a custody determination and denying the court the ability to
consider the advice contained in the evaluator’s report would make no sense when an opposing
party argued that the report should not be admitted into evidence); In re Marriage of Debra N. &
Michael S., 4 N.E.3d 78, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (finding that the court has the discretion to go
against the recommendation of the evaluator when the opposing party argues that the court’s
order was not consistent with the evaluator’s recommendation); In re Marriage of Bhati and
Singh, 920 N.E.2d 1147, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (finding that section 604(b) refers to the advice
of professional personnel, and does not refer to or intend to include “expert” opinions when an
opposing party argues that the psychiatrist should not have been permitted to testify because she
was not an expert); In re Marriage of Auer, 407 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (noting
that the policy of section 604(b) is to provide the court with as much relevant evidence as can be
secured concerning the best interests of the child and finding that there was no error in the trial
court’s acceptance of the psychologist’s testimony); In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214,
1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (finding that the language of 604(b) is permissive and not mandatory
when the petitioner argued that the trial court should have ordered psychiatric tests in accordance
with 604(a), 604(b) and 605); People ex rel. Rathbun v. Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (finding that where the parties agreed to consult with a psychologist and agreed
that he would present a recommendation to the court, the appointment of the evaluator was not
reversible error on the part of the trial court).
157. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lonvick, 995 N.E.2d at 1017 (stating that the trial court did
not err in accepting the 604(b) report as substantive evidence because the doctor made his
recommendations based on personal observation, interviews with the parties’ doctors, and
interviews with and correspondence from the parties’ friends, neighbors, and family members); In
re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 4 N.E.3d at 91 (finding that based on the record, the trial
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appoint an evaluator, but nothing in the language of the statute requires
the court to agree or disagree with the recommendation given by the
evaluator.158 More importantly, there are no standards in assessing how
much weight the evaluator’s opinion should be given.159
Further, the statute does not require the evaluator to have any specific
qualifications, but in most cases judges appoint mental-health experts
such as psychologists, psychiatrists, or social workers.160 The purpose
of the statute is to give courts the option to appoint an evaluator in order
to ascertain the best interests of the child, whether or not that results in
following or rejecting the evaluator’s opinion.161 Even without any
statutory requirement or clearly stated required qualifications for the
evaluators, in most cases, courts tend to follow the evaluator’s
recommendation.162
court’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though it went against
some of the evaluator’s suggestions).
158. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Saheb & Khazal, 880 N.E.2d 537, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(stating that an appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s decision simply because it decided
not to follow all of a 604(b) evaluator’s recommendations and nothing in 604(b) requires a trial
court to follow the advice of the evaluator); In re Marriage of Bailey, 474 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (noting that the testimony of psychologists and social workers are relevant in
determining custody, but their opinions are not binding on the court).
159. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text (citing examples of courts grappling with
how much weight to give evaluators’ opinions).
160. See Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 335 (discussing the appellate court’s conclusion that the
plain language of 604(b) provides no limitations or exceptions when the court-appointed expert
witness is a psychiatrist or other mental-health professional, and stating that a court must not
depart from this plain language by reading such an exception into the statute); see also id. at 336
(stating that the term “professional personnel” is intentionally broad).
161. See In re Marriage of Bailey, 474 N.E.2d at 396 (stating that in custody cases, the trial
court is vested with great discretion because it has a better opportunity to observe the witnesses
and determine the best interests of the child, and the testimony of psychologists and social
workers are relevant to that determination, but their opinions are not binding on the court).
162. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lonvick, 995 N.Ed.2d at 1021 (affirming the trial court’s
judgment which accepted and relied on the evaluator’s testimony); In re Marriage of Saheb &
Khazal, 880 N.E. 2d at 547 (finding that the trial court implemented most of the evaluator’s
recommendations but deciding not to implement all of the recommendations is not a ground for
reversal); In re Marriage of Auer, 407 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (affirming the
decision of the trial court which accepted the testimony of a psychologist as to the mother’s
mental condition); In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (affirming
the order of the trial court which granted custody to the father and was consistent with the
evaluator’s recommendation); People ex rel. Rathbun v. Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (affirming the order of the trial court which found that, based on the evidence
provided by the evaluator, the petitioner would be able to provide a more stable environment for
the children and the children ought to remain together). But see In re Marriage of Debra N. &
Michael S., 4 N.E.3d at 90 (going against the evaluator’s recommendation by granting custody to
the parent the evaluator believed would not serve the best interests of the child); In re Marriage of
Bailey, 474 N.E.2d at 396 (discussing the trial court’s decision to depart from the advice from the
evaluator because it believed the evaluator’s recommendation was not in the best interests of the
children involved).
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In 2011, the Supreme Court of Illinois was faced with a different type
of dispute from those that Illinois courts previously faced. The court in
Johnston v. Weil found that the evaluations, communications, reports,
and information obtained pursuant to section 604(b) are not confidential
under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality
Act when the evaluator is a mental-health professional such as
psychologist or psychiatrist.163 This decision differed from most
disputes arising out of section 604(b) as most disputes arose from the
appointment of an evaluator and whether or not the court chose to
follow the evaluator’s recommendations.164 In Johnston, an ex-wife
filed a complaint against her two ex-husbands, the child’s appointed
representatives in the divorce proceedings, and her ex-husbands’
attorneys alleging that they violated the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act by disseminating
information obtained by the 604(b) evaluator.165 The court held that
section 604(b) limited disclosure of the evaluator’s report to the parties
in the particular proceeding and provided no limitations or exceptions
when the professional is a mental-health professional.166 The court
further found that the 604(b) evaluator’s report was not privileged
because the ex-wife was being evaluated for forensic purposes, not for
mental-health purposes from a therapist in a therapeutic context.167
B. How California Crafts Its Statute
Section 730 of the California Evidence Code is the substantive rule
that gives California courts the authority to appoint an expert to evaluate
the facts and circumstances surrounding a disputed child-custody
request.168 In 1999, California became the first state to promulgate
statewide Rules of Court that set forth all necessary components of a
court-ordered child-custody evaluation and the ethical rules that all
evaluators must follow.169 Today, California still remains the only state
to enact such rules.170
California Rule of Court 5.220171 governs court-ordered child163. Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 332.
164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the court used its
discretion in deciding whether to consider evaluators’ recommendations).
165. Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 329–30.
166. Id. at 330.
167. Id.
168. CAL. EVID. CODE § 730.
169. Philip M. Shahl & Lorraine Martin, An Historical Look at Child Custody Evaluations
and the Influence of AFCC, 5 FAM. CT. REV. 42, 43 (2013).
170. Id.
171. CAL. R. CT. 5.220.
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custody evaluations and delineates several requirements for the
responsibility for evaluation services; the scope of evaluations;
cooperation with professionals in another jurisdiction; evaluator
qualifications, training, continuing education, and experience; the
service of the evaluation report; and cost-effective procedures for crossexamination of evaluators.172 The Rule further requires each court in
California to adopt a local rule in order to implement Rule 5.220,173 and
requires a child-custody evaluator to consider the best interest of the
child within the scope and purpose of the evaluation, strive to minimize
the potential for psychological trauma to children during the evaluation
process, and include in the initial meeting with each child an ageappropriate explanation of the evaluation process.174
Moreover, all evaluations are required to include a written
explanation of the process that clearly describes the purpose of the
evaluation,175 procedures used, and time required to gather and assess
the information.176 If psychological tests will be used, the written
explanation must clearly describe the role of the results in confirming or
questioning other information or previous conclusions, scope and
distribution of the report, limitations on the confidentiality process, and
cost and payment responsibility for the evaluation.177 The Rule also
provides that, in the data collection and analysis process, the evaluator
may review pertinent documents related to custody, including local
police records; observe the interaction between the parents and child;
interview the parents; conduct age-appropriate interviews; observe the
children with their parents; and consult with other experts to develop
information that may be outside the evaluator’s area of expertise.178
Ethical duties for child-custody evaluators include maintaining
objectivity, providing and gathering balanced information for both
parties, and controlling variables for bias.179 They must not offer any
172. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(c)–(j).
173. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(d)(1)(A)(i).
174. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(d)(2)(A)–(C).
175. See In re Marriage of Seagondollar, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 586–87 (Ct. App. 2006)
(finding that the order appointing the evaluator was “woefully inadequate” because it failed to
define the purpose and scope of the evaluation at all, and the evaluator could have corrected the
trial court’s error by supplying a written protocol describing the purpose of the evaluation and
explaining the procedures he intended to follow as required by California Rule of Court
5.220(e)(1)(A)).
176. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(e)(1)(A)–(B).
177. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(e)(1)(B)–(E).
178. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(e)(2)(A)–(F).
179. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(h)(1); see In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83,
102–03 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding that because the court awarded the mother sole custody based on
the evaluator’s biased report and on a child statement which may have been influenced by the
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recommendations about a party unless that party has been evaluated
directly or in consultation with another qualified neutral professional,
and they must operate within the limits of their own experience and
must disclose any limitations or bias that may affect the evaluators’
ability to conduct the evaluation.180
California Rule of Court 5.225 governs the requirements for
appointing child-custody evaluators and is divided into fifteen parts and
numerous sub-parts that thoroughly explain the requirements for
licensing, education, training, experience, procedures for selecting an
alternative evaluator, the use of interns, and evaluator
responsibilities.181 Under the Rule, in order to become an evaluator, a
person must be licensed as a psychiatrist, psychologist, marriage and
family therapist, or clinical social worker.182 If a person is not so
licensed, the rule provides that the person may be appointed if there are
no other certified evaluators who are willing and available to perform
custody evaluations within a reasonable amount of time, the parties
stipulate to the person, and the court approves the person.183 Further, a
child-custody evaluator is required to complete forty hours of education
and training on topics including psychological and developmental needs
of children; family dynamics; and the effects of separation, divorce,
domestic violence, sexual abuse, and physical, emotional, and substance
abuse.184 Child-custody evaluators must complete at least four partial
or full court-appointed child-custody evaluations within the preceding
three years and each of the four evaluations must result in a written or
oral report.185 In addition to the licensing, education, and training
requirements, a court-appointed evaluator is required to complete
continuing education and training requirements in order to remain
eligible for appointment.186
A court-appointed evaluator must submit a declaration of compliance
with all of the applicable education, training, and experience
requirements; inform each adult party of the purpose, nature, and
method of the evaluation; and provide information about the evaluator’s

evaluator’s bias, the custody order denying the father’s motion to remove the evaluator was
reversed). According to the court, impartial objectivity is a critical requirement for a section 730
child-custody evaluator. Id. at 99.
180. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(h)(3) & (6).
181. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(a); see Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 23.
182. CAL. R. CT. 5.255(c)(1)(A)–(D).
183. CAL. R. CT. 5.255(c)(2)(A)–(B).
184. CAL. R. CT. 5.255(d)(1)–(3).
185. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(g).
186. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(i)(1).
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education, experience, and training.187 An evaluator is also required to
use interview, assessment, and testing procedures that are consistent
with generally accepted clinical, forensic, scientific, diagnostic, or
medical standards.188 In addition to providing for the qualifications of
the evaluator, the Rule also delineates qualifications of interns if used in
the custody evaluation process.189 Interns must be enrolled in a
master’s or doctorate program or have obtained a graduate degree
qualifying for licensure or certification as a clinical social worker,
marriage and family therapist, psychiatrist, or psychologist.190 The
interns must be currently completing or have completed the necessary
coursework to qualify for their degree in the subjects of child-abuse
assessments and spousal or partner abuse assessment.191
C. How Pennsylvania Crafts Its Statute
Pennsylvania’s statute, while much less comprehensive than
California’s, includes more administrative language that would allow a
court to reasonably interpret the legislature’s intent of how the
evaluation process should proceed.192
Rule 1915.8 of Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states:
The court may order the child(ren) and/or any party to submit to and
fully participate in an evaluation by an appropriate expert or experts.
The order, which shall be substantially in the form set forth in Rule
1915.18, may be made upon the court’s own motion, upon the motion
of a party with reasonable notice to the person to be examined, or by
agreement of the parties. The order shall specify the place, manner,
conditions and scope of the examination and the person or persons by
whom it shall be made and to whom distributed.193

The statute additionally provides that upon entering an order
directing an evaluation pursuant to the Rule, the court must consider all
appropriate factors including the allocation of costs, execution of
appropriate authorizations and consents to facilitate the examination,
any deadlines imposed regarding the completion of the examination, the
production of any report and underlying data to counsel, and any
additional safeguards that are deemed appropriate as a result of alleged
domestic violence or child abuse.194
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

CAL. R. CT. 5.225(l).
CAL. R. CT. 5.225(l)(3).
CAL. R. CT. 5.225(m).
CAL. R. CT. 5.225(m)(2)(A).
CAL. R. CT. 5.225(m)(2)(B).
PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(a)–(d).
PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(a).
PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(a)(1)–(5).
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Further, the expert is required to give the court any copies of any
reports arising out of the evaluation, including the findings, results of all
tests given, diagnoses, and conclusions.195 The evaluator is subject to
cross-examination by all counsel, regardless of who obtains or pays for
the evaluation.196 If a party refuses to obey an order of the court made
under subsection (a) of the rule, the court is allowed to enter an order
disallowing the disobedient party to support or oppose any designated
claims or defenses and prohibit the party from introducing into evidence
certain testimony or documents.197 Willful failure or refusal to comply
with an order entered pursuant to the rule may give rise to a finding of
contempt, and the court may impose sanctions as it deems
appropriate.198
Unlike Illinois’ statute, Pennsylvania’s refers to a substantive form
that must be filled out when ordering an expert child-custody
evaluation.199 It provides whether the evaluator shall or shall not make
specific recommendations for legal custody, depending on what the
parties decide.200 Further, it mandates that the parties fully participate
with the evaluator on a timely basis, and that the evaluation be covered
by insurance if it is medically necessary.201 The form additionally
states that the evaluator may consult with and interview anyone who the
evaluator reasonably believes can provide relevant information,
including other experts and fact witnesses.202 Additionally, the
evaluator is allowed to consult with other qualified professionals
without court approval.203
Similar to Illinois and California,
Pennsylvania’s statute also states that the evaluation report must be
made available to counsel and the evaluator must be subject to crossexamination by all counsel.204
D. Conclusion
Comparing Illinois’ statute granting courts authority to conduct an
evaluation for child-custody purposes to other states provides a context
for where Illinois stands in relation to other states, and sheds light on its
195. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(b).
196. Id.
197. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(c).
198. Id.
199. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(a); see PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18 (providing the form to be used for
the order of the court in directing expert evaluation in a custody matter pursuant to Rule 1915.8).
200. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(3).
201. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(4)–(5).
202. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(8).
203. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(9).
204. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(11), (13).
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lack of detail and comprehensiveness.205 California has the most
comprehensive statute, as it is the only state that has promulgated
necessary components of a child-custody evaluation and the ethical
rules that all evaluators must follow.206 Pennsylvania’s statute, while
having more substance than Illinois’, still fails to have the level of detail
that California’s statute provides.207 Illinois fails to provide any
guidance, as it grants authority to the courts without delineating any
necessary components of a child-custody evaluation or ethical duties of
evaluators.208
III. ANALYSIS
The development of the “best interest of the child” standard has led
mental-health professionals to increasingly become part of the decisionmaking process in custody cases in order to provide an objective
analysis of the child’s psychological state to aid the court in determining
the best interests of the child.209
To determine the child’s psychological state and what custody
decision is in his or her best interest, most mental-health professionals
conduct psychological evaluations.210 Typically, comprehensive
psychological evaluations are conducted on each parent, child, and
potential stepparent.211 The mental-health expert’s role is to provide a
205. See infra Part III.A (analyzing section 604(b)’s lack of guidelines for Illinois courts to
follow in the course of the evaluation).
206. Shahl & Martin, supra note 169, at 43.
207. Pennsylvania’s statute does not include ethical duties of the evaluator; any licensing,
training, or experience requirements for evaluators; and it does not require a detailed explanation
of the evaluation and procedures used.
208. See infra Part III.A (analyzing section 604(b)’s lack of guidelines for Illinois courts to
follow in the course of the evaluation).
209. See H. D. Kirkpatrick et al., Psychological and Legal Considerations in Reviewing the
Work Product of a Colleague in Child Custody Evaluations, 8 J. CHILD. CUSTODY 103, 104
(2011) (describing the custody evaluator’s role); Shuman, supra note 65, at 136 (explaining the
transformation of the role of mental-health professionals in child-custody determinations); see
also McCann et al., supra note 122, at 28 (stating that increased attention is given to using
psychological tests in child-custody proceedings as a result of the growing area of psychological
expertise in court).
Psychological testing of parents in custody cases (for intelligence, personality, and/or
psychopathology) has been described variously as of no utility, of dubious value,
potentially useful when performed selectively and only when a clear need is identified,
and one of the better indications of a parent’s true feelings and intentions. Rarely are
opinions of this type offered with any empirical support or with reference to any
particular psychological tests.
GRISSO, supra note 87, at 200 (internal citations omitted).
210. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 28.
211. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 28; see Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 158
(explaining the goals of psychological testing in custody determinations).
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neutral and objective evaluation of the parents and children and make
recommendations to the court based on the psychological best interests
of the child.212 This role requires mental-health experts to assess the
connection between the child’s developmental and socio-emotional
needs and the parents’ ability to meet those needs.213 When
psychological tests are employed in a forensic context, it is the duty of
the expert to use methods that are valid, reliable, and relevant to the
ultimate issue in the litigation.214 In the context of child-custody
proceedings, a psychological test is relevant if it provides data that will
help guide the determination of what the best interests of the child
actually are.215
The American Psychological Association (“APA”) first published its
guidelines for child-custody evaluations in divorce proceedings in
1994.216 The APA guidelines stressed the need for multiple methods of
collecting data, cautioned against over-interpreting or inappropriately
interpreting the data in the evaluation process, and emphasized the
importance of parenting capacity, the needs of the child, and the
resulting “fit” in assessing the child’s best interests.217
The way in which child-custody evaluations are conducted by 604(b)
evaluators is problematic, because section 604(b) lacks clear guidelines
that would provide consistency in the outcomes of custody cases,218 the
212. Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, at 63; Kirkpatrick et al., supra note
209, at 104; see American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations
in Family Law Proceedings, 65 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 863 (2010) [hereinafter Guidelines for
Child Custody Evaluations] (“Psychologists render a valuable service when they provide
competent and impartial opinions with direct relevance to the psychological best interests of the
child.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
213. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 35; see Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations,
supra note 212, at 864 (stating that the most useful and influential evaluations focus upon skills,
deficits, values, and tendencies relevant to parenting attributes and a child’s psychological needs).
214. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 29; see Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra
note 93, at 265 (suggesting that mental-health professionals consider the reliability of a test
before using it in a psychological evaluation); Vivienne Roseby, Uses of Psychological Testing in
a Child-Focused Approach to Child Custody Evaluations, 29 FAM. L.Q. 97, 99 (1995) (discussing
how mental-health professionals have been criticized for going beyond the limitations of
scientific knowledge in custody cases).
215. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 29. If the test measures anything other than the best
interests of the child, it is not valid in the context of child-custody proceedings.
216. Francella A. Quinnell & James N. Bow, Psychological Tests Used in Child Custody
Evaluations, 19 BEHAV. SCI. L. 491, 492 (2001). See generally Guidelines for Child Custody
Evaluations, supra note 212 (discussing the 2010 version of the APA’s child-custody evaluation
guidelines).
217. Quinnell & Bow, supra note 216, at 492. The APA guidelines have continued to stress
the same ideas over the years. See generally Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations, supra
note 212 (discussing the 2010 version of the APA guidelines for child-custody evaluations).
218. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 4.
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science behind certain psychological tests used in evaluations lacks
reliability, validity, and relevance,219 and the lack of guidelines
exacerbates the potential risks of evaluator bias.220 Further, evaluators’
opinions tend to directly affect the outcome of the decision, which is
problematic because their opinions are often based on the faulty results
that arise when CAIs are conducted in forensic contexts.221 These
problems call into question the utility of using CAIs such as the MMPI2 in child-custody evaluations to help the court come to a determination
regarding the best interest of the child.222 This Part first addresses the
lack of guidelines for 604(b) evaluators regarding the scope of their
evaluation.223 Then, it analyzes how certain psychological tests may be
unreliable, invalid, and biased when used in a family court setting.224
Lastly, it analyzes the direct effects that evaluators’ opinions have on
the custody decision.225
A. Lack of 604(b) Guidelines for Illinois Courts
The language of section 604(b) is vague and leaves much room for
interpreting what is and is not allowed during the appointment
process.226 Section 604(b) merely states that the court “may seek the

219. Id. But cf. STANLEY KISSEL & NELSON W. FREELING, EVALUATING CHILDREN FOR
COURTS USING PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 5 (1990).
[Testing] can provide information . . . to determine fitness in being able to parent
adequately. . . . Psychological testing can also reveal the emotional makeup of the
child and parents and can provide information about such dimensions as maturity,
antisocial tendencies, propensity to anxiety and depression, and dangerousness to self
and others. . . . Psychological testing may provide important information regarding
which parent may be more capable to raise a child and also in resolving visitation
issues.
Id.
220. The lack of guidelines leads to psychologists and other mental-health professionals
utilizing faulty psychological testing and administration, and research has demonstrated that the
particular professional conducting the tests can affect the outcome of the tests based on their
biases. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the effect that psychologists have on the outcome of
psychological tests).
221. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing how the judiciary’s heavy reliance
on expert testimony results in most expert opinions being the dispositive factor in child-custody
cases).
222. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 4.
223. See infra Part III.A (analyzing section 604(b)’s lack of guidelines for Illinois courts to
follow in the course of the evaluation).
224. See infra Part III.B (discussing the unreliability and biased nature of CAIs in family court
settings).
225. See infra Part III.C (analyzing the direct effects of using court-appointed mental-health
experts in child-custody cases).
226. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (2014) (“The court may seek the advice of
professional personnel, whether or not employed by the court on a regular basis.”).
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advice of professional personnel” but does not provide further
explanation as to what that entails; rather, the statute only uses vague
language that grants courts the discretion to appoint an evaluator to help
in the determination of child custody.227 When Illinois courts choose to
appoint an evaluator, psychologists or psychiatrists are usually
appointed even though they are not required, and the evaluator has free
reign to employ whatever method he or she chooses in conducting the
evaluation and report.228 The Illinois Supreme Court even expressly
stated that section 604(b) does not provide any limitations or exceptions
when the appointed professional is a mental-health professional.229
Another issue is that section 604(b) does not provide a minimum
level of training or education and therefore implies that someone with a
low level of knowledge and skills about conducting psychological
evaluations could complete the evaluation.230 Furthermore, no rules
require a certain level of experience in evaluators.231 It is necessary for
Illinois to set minimum experience requirements because the quality of
the evaluator affects the overall quality of the evaluation itself.232
In addition to the lack of requirements regarding experience, section
604(b) lacks any rules regarding time constraints for the evaluation
process.233 Under the language of section 604(b) and the lack of
guidelines that steer the evaluation process, an evaluator could
227. See id. (“The court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or not
employed by the court on a regular basis.”); Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 336 (Ill. 2011)
(“[T]he term professional personnel is intentionally broad” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 3 (“The lack of clarity in ‘the best interest of the child’
standard is only further compounded by the fact that there is nothing within the IMDMA that
defines the term ‘professional’ specifically within the context of [child-custody evaluations], nor
is there any instruction as to acceptable methods for execution of the evaluations.”).
228. See supra Part II.A. (discussing what happens in practice when Illinois courts appoint an
evaluator pursuant to section 604(b)).
229. Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 337.
230. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 4; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (allowing
the court to “seek the advice of professional personnel,” but not establishing minimum credentials
for the professional personnel).
231. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 5; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (omitting a
requirement that professional personnel have a certain level of experience).
232. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 5.
233. Compare Katherine J. Baker, Addressing the Pre-Admission and Extrajudicial Use of
Child Custody Reports, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 155, 170–74 (2010) (discussing the
research that discusses both the positive and negative implications of having a mental-health
professional versus a lay person providing observational data to the court), and Kirkpatrick et al.,
supra note 209, at 105 (opining that research shows there are reasons to be concerned about the
quality of child-custody evaluations given the wide variance in the evaluators’ training and
experience to conduct what may be the most complex and difficult forensic mental-health
evaluation); with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (omitting any requirement that professional
personnel have a certain level of experience).
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theoretically choose to spend one hour with the child and parents before
reaching a decision.234 Nothing in the statute even states that interviews
must be conducted, although interviews are usually part of the
evaluation process.235 Further, the lack of guidelines is problematic
because there is no consistency with which to apply the statute in
practice: Illinois courts can appoint whomever they want236, and the
evaluator can essentially do whatever he or she wants in the evaluation
process.237
Because section 604(b) lacks guidelines regarding
requirements for evaluators’ experience, training, education, and time
constraints for the evaluations, courts are left to interpret the statute as
narrowly or broadly as they see fit, and it makes it difficult to
adequately control the evaluation process.238
B. Unreliability and Biased Nature
of Clinical Assessment Instruments in Family
Court Settings
This Subpart first analyzes the likely flawed validity and reliability of
CAIs when used in child-custody proceedings.239 It then proceeds to

234. This does not usually happen in practice, but the statute allows for it based on its plain
language. See infra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing cases where an evaluators’
interview with parties was considered in the evaluator’s final recommendation).
235. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lonvick, 995 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)
(describing how the court-appointed evaluator met with the parties on multiple occasions and
conducted several interviews with different people, ultimately recommending that the father be
granted sole custody of the child); In re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 4 N.E.3d 78, 80–81
(Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (stating that the court-appointed licensed clinical psychologist interviewed
both parents and observed their interactions with the child in addition to observing the child’s
interactions with her stepbrother and half brothers); In re Marriage of Bhati & Singh, 920 N.E.2d
1147, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (discussing how the court-appointed clinical psychologist
interviewed all of the relevant parties, visited the parties’ homes, and spoke with the child’s
teacher and daycare provider); In re Marriage of Bailey, 474 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(stating that the psychiatrist interviewed both the parties and the children); In re Marriage of
Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that the court-appointed psychologist
interviewed each child separately and then together with the father); People ex rel. Rathbun v.
Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (stating that the court-appointed clinical
psychologist interviewed the parties and all persons involved in the controversy).
236. “Professional personnel” is the only limitation. As long as the person is a “professional,”
he or she can be appointed. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (“The court may seek the advice
of professional personnel, whether or not employed by the court on a regular basis.”).
237. See Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 337 (Ill. 2011) (“[S]ection 604(b) of the
[IMDMA] provides no limitations or exceptions when the section 604(b) professional is a mental
health professional.”).
238. A child-custody evaluation is a complicated process because numerous variables and
sources must be considered. It seems necessary that strict guidelines exist in order for the
evaluation process to be tightly controlled and conducted consistently throughout custody cases.
239. See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining that CAIs are likely flawed in both validity and
reliability when used in child-custody proceedings because these tests were not designed and
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analyze the flawed administration of these tests.240
1. Flawed Validity & Reliability
Based on the results of meta-analyses, the validity estimates for the
Rorschach and MMPI were not significantly different. The tests can be
considered an adequate measure of psychometric properties if used for
the purposes for which they were designed and validated.241 Metaanalyses that have been used to support the Rorschach test have been
flawed by way of not analyzing validity and reliability separately.242
Further, research has shown that the Rorschach is not as valid as the
MMPI, and the incremental validity of the Rorschach is poor.243 In
fact, the academic community has recognized the Rorschach’s flaws,
and some researchers propose deemphasizing it in the graduate school
curriculum in favor of stronger emphasis on courses about judgment,
decision making, and the use of structured interviews.244
The value of a psychological test parallels its validity, and a valid test
only has meaning if we acknowledge the purposes for which it is
valid.245 Despite this qualifying characteristic of validity, many
psychologists make the mistake of assuming that a psychological test is
valid for any kind of evaluation.246 Thus, the issue of using a test
validated for use in that context).
240. See infra Part III.B.2 (identifying why the administration of these tests in the childcustody context is flawed).
241. See Howard N. Garb et al., The Validity of the Rorschach and the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory: Results From Meta-Analyses, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 402, 402 (1998) (exploring
the flaws in specific meta-analyses of the Rorschach and MMPI tests). Although these studies are
from 1988 and therefore more than twenty-five years old, their methodology is still accurate, and
their fundamental critique remains unchanged.
242. Id.
243. Id.; see Bow et al., supra note 143, at 38 (stating that the prevailing view is that objective
tests are more valid and reliable than projective tests, and that the scoring and interpretation of
objective tests is less ambiguous and controversial than projective tests); B. K. Clark, Acting in
the Best Interests of the Child: Essential Components of a Child Custody Evaluation, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 19, 31 (1995) (opining that if projective tests such as the Rorschach are used in custody
cases, they should be used with extreme caution because of their lack of validity, reliability, and
level of subjectivity used in their interpretation); Mel Hamel et al., A Study of Nonpatient
Preadolescent Rorschach Protocols, 75 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 280, 284–290 (2000)
(finding that above-average children without any history of mental illness appeared to be
psychotic, clinically depressed, cognitively impaired, or highly resistant to establishing and
maintaining relationships on the Rorschach test).
244. Garb et al., supra note 241, at 402; see Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 164 (describing
criticisms of the Rorschach based on its questionable validity and reliability in measuring
psychological constructs).
245. Terrence W. Campbell, Challenging Psychologists and Psychiatrists as Witnesses, 73
MICH. B.J. 68, 71 (1994). For example, an IQ test may be valid for purposes of predicting future
academic success, but it is not valid for diagnosing brain abnormalities.
246. Id.
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designed to detect personality disorders and other psychopathologies in
an evaluation of a child’s best interest presents itself.247
An ideally valid test for purposes of child-custody litigation would
accurately measure the best interests of the child.248 Unfortunately, the
“best interest of the child” construct is so subjective and value-laden
that it is impossible to accurately measure it in a forensic assessment
evaluation.249 The “best interest of the child” needs an operational
definition in order to be tested for, and given that no specific operational
definition exists, validating a psychological test that aims to predict
what is in the child’s best interests is theoretically impossible.250 There
are plenty of tests that aim to measure some aspect of personality, but
speculating as to how that personality characteristic would result in
superior or inferior parenting is beyond the scope of these tests.251 No
psychological tests have been validated to directly assess parenting
ability,252 and given the complex nature of relationships and parenting,
it is not surprising that no test is available to determine parents’ abilities
and what arrangements would be in the child’s best interests.253
Because the ideal test does not exist, evaluators use CAIs that do not
measure the “best interest of the child.”254
The MMPI, for example, was developed to screen for severe
psychopathologies such as depression and schizophrenia.255 The MMPI
involves the correlation of individual MMPI profiles with group MMPI
247. See supra Part I.D. (discussing the difference between different assessment instruments
and how CAIs are designed to be used a therapeutic context).
248. Any personality test, such as the MMPI-2, is not valid in the context of child-custody
proceedings because it cannot accurately measure the best interests of the child, even if they are
valid for diagnosing personality disorders.
249. Shuman, supra note 65, at 143. What is in the best interests of one child will not be the
same as what is in the best interests of another child; therefore, each parent’s definition of the
“best interest of the child” will vary by case.
250. Id.; see MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 559 (commenting that tests of intellectual
capacity, achievement, personality style, and psychopathology assess clinical constructs that are
linked only indirectly, at best, to the key issues concerning custody and visitation).
251. Shuman, supra note 65, at 143; see Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69,
at 68 (discussing how an evaluator who attempts to use a therapeutic evaluation for forensic
purposes extrapolates the implications about legal capacities from mental-state information that
may be insufficient for such a determination).
252. Vivienne Roseby, Uses of Psychological Testing in a Child-Focused Approach to Child
Custody Evaluations, 29 FAM. L.Q. 97, 105 (1995); Shuman, supra note 65, at 144.
253. Shuman, supra note 65, at 144. Psychological tests that assess clinical constructs may be
helpful if the child needs to be tested for a learning disability or if there is an issue about whether
the child has a serious mental disorder, such as depression.
254. These tests include the MMPI-2, MCMI, and Rorschach, and they are the most widely
used psychological tests in child-custody litigation. They measure psychopathologies such as
personality abnormalities and depression, rather than the best interest of the child.
255. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145.
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profiles, and using the MMPI in child-custody evaluations to predict
how a parent’s profile will affect his or her children requires drawing
inferences that are well beyond the original design of the test.256 The
MMPI does not measure whether a person is a good or bad parent, and,
though it may provide reliable information about parents’ personalities,
there is no scale that predicts what custodial arrangements are in the
child’s best interests.257 Concluding that the best interests of a child can
be measured by certain findings of parents’ personalities and
psychopathologies is an unwarranted extrapolation from what the test is
designed to measure and is pure speculation.258
In addition, though there are no studies that correlate personality
attributes identified by the Rorschach with good parenting, the test is
still frequently used in custody litigation and infrequently challenged.259
No cases address whether, when, or how the Rorschach should be used
in child-custody evaluations.260
Further, the forensic context in which these tests are used threatens
their validity because of the coerced nature of the assessment.261
Examinees do not take these tests voluntarily, and they have added
incentive to misrepresent their statements and be less than candid.262
256. Id.; see BENJAMIN M. SCHUTZ ET AL., SOLOMON’S SWORD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
CONDUCTING CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 69 (1989) (“It requires many inferential leaps to
connect [traditional tests] with parental competencies we are attempting to measure.”).
257. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145. Again, this is because each case is subjective and what is
in each child’s best interests will vary.
258. See Brodzinsky, supra note 86, at 218 (“There is a clear need for standardized
assessment procedures that are geared specifically to the issues confronting the child custody
evaluator. Such procedures, though, whether they are clinician-administered tests or self-report
questionnaires, must have proven reliability and validity for forensic purposes. Unfortunately,
the current array of tests and questionnaires typically used by custody evaluators does not meet
these criteria.”).
259. Shuman, supra note 65, at 148; see J. Reid Meloy et al., Authority of the Rorschach:
Legal Citations During the Last 50 Years, 69 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 53, 53 (1997)
(finding between 1945 and 1995, the Rorschach was cited in 247 state, federal, and military
courts of appeal, and 26 cases were identified in which the reliability or validity of the Rorschach
data were at issue); Irving B. Weiner et al., Is the Rorschach Welcome in the Courtroom?, 67 J.
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 422, 422 (1996) (finding that in a survey of 7934 federal and state
court cases in which psychologists presented Rorschach testimony, only 6 challenged the
appropriateness of the test); Lois A. Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, Psychological Evaluations in
Divorce Custody: Problems, Principles, and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 157, 165 (Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987)
(“Projective measures have not been shown to have the requisite psychometric properties to
render them reliable or valid for predicting custodial functioning.”).
260. Shuman, supra note 65, at 148.
261. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 46.
262. Id.; see Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, at 68 (stating that when
forensic evaluations are conducted pursuant to child-custody litigation, examinees have a clear
motivation to minimize psychopathology or negative characteristics). The tests have control
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These tests are designed to assess a voluntary test subject, and the
distinction skews the results.263
Given how often the MMPI is utilized in custody proceedings, it is
ironic and shocking how rarely the courts address how it should be
used.264 One would think that the validity and reliability of a
psychological test in child-custody proceedings would be an important
analysis before resorting to its use; courts, however, have ignored the
fundamentals and methodologies.265 Hundreds of decisions refer to an
expert’s use of psychological tests such as the MMPI-2 and MCMI, but
only a handful of decisions raise the issue of the tests’ underlying
reliability or validity.266
Another threat to the validity of psychological testing in childcustody contexts is a concept called test-item transparency.267 This
term refers to the ease with which test subjects can distinguish what
aspects of their perceptions, emotions, cognitions, or patterns of
behavior are likely to be revealed by their answers to specific test
questions.268 When test subjects can easily figure out what will be
revealed about them by their responses to certain test questions, they
can offer responses that will generate data, which when scored and
interpreted will create the impression that suits what they want to
portray.269 To try and combat this, some test items are included for the
sole purpose of measuring test subject’s attempts at “impression
management.”270 Test subjects on the receiving end of psychological
questioning and evaluations likely believe that their interests will be
best served if they can successfully create an image that is consistent
with their litigation strategy.271 In the context of child custody, litigants
are “motivated to endorse statements descriptive of virtues not

scales for deception, but they are not perfect.
263. See Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, at 68 (opining that it is
reasonable to assume that an examinee in a therapeutic context is describing his or her experience
and symptoms accurately because he or she has an interest in seeking improvement or recovery;
however, exceptions exist when an examinee feels coerced and is concerned about what his or her
test results will reveal in a forensic setting).
264. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 146. But see In re Marriage of L.R., 559 N.E.2d 779, 788 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(finding that the use of the MCMI in determining that the father was a child molester was
questionable given the fact that the test was designed for clinical rather than forensic purposes).
267. David A. Martindale & James R. Flens, Test Item Transparency: The Undisclosed Threat
to Test Validity, 29 THE MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST 3 (2011).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 4.
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characteristic of [them] and reject as not applicable statements that may,
in fact, provide accurate descriptions of psychological problems
experienced by them.”272
2. Flawed Administration
Tests such as the MMPI-2 and MCMI provide manuals with specific
instructions on how to administer, score, and interpret each test.273 Past
research on child-custody evaluations utilizing the MMPI-2 and MCMI
raise questions not only about the tests’ effectiveness, but also about
their implementation.274 Such areas of concern include unmonitored
test administration, underestimation of the test readability level, lack of
verification of computer-entered data, over-reliance on computergenerated interpretive reports, and use of inappropriate significance
cutoffs.275 All psychological tests require a relatively quiet setting free
from distractions, and, to the extent that the testing instructions and
administrative conditions are less than ideal, the performance on the
tests will be less than ideal.276
A psychologist who conducts the psychological test can heavily
influence the results because a psychologist’s expectations affect the
way he or she administers and scores the test.277 For example, a
psychologist who views his or her test subject as smart will assign them
a higher IQ score than when he or she views the subject as
unintelligent.278 Research also shows that African-American males
obtain a higher IQ score when their examiner is African-American
compared to Caucasian.279
While it is reasonable to assume that mental-health experts are
272. Id.
273. Bow et al., supra note 124, at 39; see FRIEDMAN, ET AL., supra note 119, at 163 (stating
that because administering the MMPI-2 is relatively easy, many professionals overlook important
factors that tend to influence the participants’ test-taking attitudes and contribute to invalid
results).
274. Bow et al., supra note 124, at 39.
275. Id.
276. Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra note 93, at 266.
277. Campbell, supra note 245, at 71. But see FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 163
(discussing how the test participants often believe the test is not important so they compromise
their cooperation by reading the test items too quickly and lessening their overall investment in
the task.).
278. Campbell, supra note 245, at 71; see, e.g., Harold E. Schroeder & Dennis L. Kleinsasser,
Examiner Bias: A Determinant of Children’s Verbal Behavior on the WISC., 39 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 451, 451 (1972) (finding that the test subject’s total verbal IQ scores were
significantly affected by the expectations of the evaluators).
279. Campbell, supra note 245, at 71; Francis Terrell et al., Effects of Race of Examiner and
Cultural Mistrust on the WAIS Performance of Black Students, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 750, 750 (1981).
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experts in their clinical judgments based upon their level of education,
training, and experience, this is often not the case.280 Typically,
psychologists and psychiatrists evaluate their patients by comparing
how close their patients’ symptoms correspond to the disorder being
tested.281 However, some of these symptoms occur in people without
mental disorders and it is therefore difficult to discriminate between
someone with or without a disorder because both types of people exhibit
these symptoms.282 Tests that measure abnormal personality such as
the MMPI-2 detect sub-clinical presence of personality characteristics
that are present in the general population and are only of clinical
concern when they surpass a certain level.283
Psychologists and psychiatrists often find evidence of abnormality
because they expect to find it, not because the abnormality actually
exists.284 During interviews, these mental-health experts question their
subject in a way that biases the information received.285 Assumptions
about some aspect of a subject’s life, such as drinking or marriage,
increase the number of questions the expert will ask about these topics,
and as a result the expert will find the answers for which they are
looking.286
Psychologists and psychiatrists often reach their diagnostic
conclusions very early on in their interviews, and they tend to adhere to
their conclusions even when contrary evidence manifests itself.287 They
overestimate the amount of information they utilize in their evaluations,
and they believe they weigh multiple factors, when in fact they rely only
upon a minimal amount of data.288 Research shows that mental-health
experts arrive at their conclusions within minutes of an evaluation,
280. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68.
281. Id.
282. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 161.
283. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 161.
284. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; see Dana B. Sattin, Possible Sources of Error in the
Evaluation of Psychopathology, 36 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 99, 99 (1980) (finding that the
perception of mental illness occurred for all subjects when mental illness expectancies were
high).
285. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68.
286. Id.; see Hal R. Arkes, Impediments to Accurate Clinical Judgment and Possible Ways to
Minimize Their Impact, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323, 323–26 (1981)
(discussing five impediments to accurate clinical judgment: inability to assess co-variation,
influence of preconceived notions, lack of awareness of one’s judgmental processes,
overconfidence, and hindsight bias).
287. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; Lee N. Robins & John E. Helzer, Diagnosis and
Clinical Assessment: The Current State of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 37 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 409,
424 (1986).
288. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; J. Gillis & T. Moran, An Analysis of Drug Decisions in
a State Psychiatric Hospital, 37 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 32, 39–41 (1981).
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sometimes in as quickly as thirty seconds.289 Additionally, there is no
correlation between mental-health experts’ level of confidence that they
express in their conclusions and how accurate their conclusions are in
fact.290
For example, errors in predicting dangerousness by
psychologists and psychiatrists range from fifty-four percent to ninetyfour percent, with an average of eighty percent.291 Mental-health
experts may also engage in impulsive questioning that biases the
collected data rather than adhering to a well-prepared set of questions
that would allow them to obtain the most relevant and comprehensive
information possible.292
Mental-health experts may overlook their patients’ strengths and
resources that would enable them to deal with their psychopathological
issues and assume that certain symptoms manifest in most other
circumstances of their patients’ lives.293 However, people tend to adjust
well to certain life situations despite the fact that they may struggle with
other situations.294
C. The Direct Effect on the Custody Decision
The use of court-appointed mental-health experts in child-custody
proceedings without any guidelines for their methods and procedures
has altered expert authority and their role in custody cases.295 The
recommendations that 604(b) evaluators give have a considerable
amount of influence on the course of the custody litigation.296 Many
courts accord a significant amount of weight to the opinions of these
evaluators, and this often results in acceptance of the recommendations
without challenge.297
289. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; J. Yager, Psychiatric Eclecticism: A Cognitive View,
134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 736, 736–41 (1977).
290. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; Robyn M. Dawes, Representative Thinking in Clinical
Judgment, 6 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV., 425, 425–41 (1986); Danny Wedding, Clinical and
Statistical Prediction in Neuropsychology, 5 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 49, 49–55 (1983).
291. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Criminal
Behavior: A Methodological Critique and Prospectus in Deterrence and Incapacitations:
Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, in NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFERENCE SYSTEM 244, 246 (1978).
292. Campbell, supra note 277, at 69; Robins & Helzer, supra note 287.
293. Campbell, supra note 245, at 69.
294. Id.; C. Wilkinson & W. O’Connor, Human Ecology and Mental Illness, 139 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 985, 986 (1982).
295. Shuman, supra note 65, at 159.
296. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 35; Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 157.
297. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 35; see Peter Ash & Melvin Guyer, The Function of
Psychiatric Evaluations in Contested Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 25 AM. ACAD. CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 554, 557 (1986) (finding an eighty-five percent concordance rate
between the expert’s recommendation and the judge’s decision).
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A study that examined 282 contested child-custody cases found that
an evaluator recommendation was the primary factor that directly
affected the judges’ decisions.298 Later, a study examining judges’
perspectives regarding child-custody evaluations conducted by mentalhealth professionals found that most judges believed child-custody
evaluations had a significant impact on their decision making, and
judges’ rulings were generally consistent with evaluator
recommendations.299
As analyzed above, these recommendations are not necessarily
reliable or founded on good methods, and this poses a great threat to the
outcome of the child-custody decision when the evaluators’
recommendations have such a significant role in the evaluation
process.300 Because section 604(b) lacks clear guidelines for courts to
follow in their evaluation processes, evaluators are free to employ any
method in conducting their evaluations, and this can lead to choosing
questionable methods. These methods have been proven invalid and
unreliable in the context of child-custody proceedings. Moreover,
judges tend to let evaluators’ recommendations influence their ultimate
custody decision, and this is problematic when the recommendations are
based upon faulty psychological testing. The end result is a custody
decision based upon the results of testing that has been proven incapable
of ascertaining what courts seek to determine in child-custody
proceedings: the best interest of the child.
IV. PROPOSAL
Illinois courts should enact strict statutory guidelines for the
appointment of 604(b) evaluators in order to reduce the risk of evaluator
bias and gain more control over the evaluation process in general.301
Furthermore, CAIs302 should not be used in child-custody proceedings
because they were designed for use in therapeutic assessment rather
than forensic assessment and their validity and reliability have been
298. Carla C. Kunin et al., An Archival Study of Decision-Making in Child Custody Disputes,
48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 564, 564 (1992). The study found that judges were influenced by
recommendations sixty percent of the time, and were influenced fifteen percent of the time by an
inferred measure of child preference.
299. Erika M. Waller & A. E. Daniel, Purpose and Utility of Child Custody Evaluations:
From the Perspective of Judges, 32 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 24 (2004).
300. See supra Part III.B.1–2 (analyzing the flawed validity, reliability, and administration of
CAIs in child-custody proceedings).
301. See infra Part IV.A (examining the need for structured guidelines in appointing
evaluators).
302. Psychological tests that were initially developed to be used in assessment, diagnosis, and
treatment planning in therapeutic contexts.
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severely questioned in the context of child-custody proceedings.303
A. Necessary Guidelines
Illinois courts should use their power304 to enact local rules: (1)
requiring all child-custody evaluations to narrowly define the scope of
their evaluation; (2) setting minimum education and experience
requirements for evaluators; and (3) barring the evaluator from giving
an opinion regarding the ultimate legal issue before the court.305 An
ideal solution would be to adopt a rule similar to that of California Rule
of Court 5.225, because it has proven effective.306 For example, in In re
Marriage of Seagondollar, a mother and father were given shared
custody of their four minor children.307 The father appealed from a
post-judgment order changing the arrangement and giving his ex-wife
sole custody and allowing her to move away with her children.308
During trial, the court appointed a doctor to conduct an evaluation, who
ultimately recommended that the children be allowed to relocate with
their mother.309 The court of appeals found that the order appointing
the child-custody evaluator was “woefully inadequate” because even
though it specified that an evaluator would be appointed, it failed to
define the purpose and scope of the evaluation, and the evaluator could
have corrected the trial court’s error by supplying a written protocol
describing the purpose of the evaluation and explaining the procedures
he intended to follow.310 As a result, the court reversed the postjudgment custody modification and remanded the matter to the lower
court.311
Another case that further illustrates the effectiveness of the California
statute is In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A., in which the parties,
including the child, agreed to submit to a full psychological examination
by a doctor so he could make a recommendation regarding custody.312
The court of appeals found that because the lower court awarded the
mother sole custody based on the evaluator’s biased report and on a
statement made by the child that may have been influenced by the
303. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the use of CAIs should be limited).
304. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 22(h) gives local circuits the power to enact certain local
rules. ILL. S. CT. R. 22(h).
305. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 22.
306. Id. at 23.
307. In re Marriage of Seagondollar, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 576 (Ct. App. 2006).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 579.
310. Id. at 586.
311. Id. at 587.
312. In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 87 (Ct. App. 2012).
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evaluator’s bias, the custody order denying the father’s motion to
remove the evaluator was reversed.313 The court stressed that impartial
objectivity is a critical requirement for a section 730 child-custody
evaluator.314 Additionally, the court acknowledged that one of the
reasons the Judicial Council adopted the California Rules of Court
establishing uniform standards of practice for court-ordered childcustody evaluations is because the results of child-custody evaluations
are generally given great weight by the judge in deciding contested
custody issues.315
These cases illustrate the effectiveness that strict statutory guidelines
have on the outcome of child-custody cases.316 In both cases, the Court
found that the guidelines were not adhered to and properly remanded
the cases to the lower court so the errors could be remedied.317 This
kind of appellate remediation is not possible with the current status of
Illinois’ statute because there is nothing preventing Illinois courts from
conducting evaluations a certain way.318 California has crafted its
statute such that strict requirements are in place, and California
appellate courts are prepared to identify when and where these
requirements are not followed.319
Illinois should also draw from the Pennsylvania statute because it
provides that if a party refuses to obey an order of the court, the court is
allowed to make an order disallowing “the disobedient party to support
or oppose any designated claims or defenses” and prohibit the party
from introducing into evidence certain testimony or documents.320
Also, under the Pennsylvania Rule, willful failure or refusal to comply
with an order may give rise to a finding of contempt, and the court is
allowed to impose sanctions as it deems appropriate.321
Illinois would benefit from adopting highly structured and detailed
313. Id. at 85.
314. Id. at 99.
315. Id.
316. See infra notes 307–12 (examining the cases In re Marriage of Seagondollar and In re
Marriage of Adams and Jack A.).
317. In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 85; In re Marriage of
Seagondollar, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 587 (Ct. App. 2006).
318. California’s statute explicitly states that the order for an evaluation must state the
purpose and scope of the evaluation. CAL. R. CT. 5.220. Therefore, if the order does not include
the requisite information, it will be inadequate until it is remedied.
319. California Rule 5.220 breaks down the rules for court-ordered evaluations, ranging from
section (a) through (j). CAL. R. CT. 5.220(a)–(j). California Rule 5.225 sets forth the
appointment requirements for child-custody evaluators, ranging from section (a) through (o).
CAL. R. CT. 5.225(a)–(o).
320. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(c).
321. Id.
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rules such as California’s, and the threat of sanctions and disallowing a
party from introducing certain evidence would provide an incentive for
parties to be as cooperative as possible.322 If Illinois courts adopted
child-custody rules that had a similar level of detail to the California
Rule and sanctioning requirements in the case of willful failure to
comply like those in the Pennsylvania statute, child-custody evaluations
would be better controlled and less susceptible to invalidity caused by
unqualified evaluators and lenient standards of protocol.323
B. Abolishing the Use of Clinical Assessment Instruments
In Favor of Forensic Assessment Instruments
in Child-Custody Proceedings
Given the threats to the validity and reliability of CAIs in childcustody contexts, it seems most obvious that these tests should not be
allowed in child-custody proceedings.324 In a situation where the child
has a learning disability or serious mental disorder, use of a CAI such as
the MMPI-2 or Rorschach should be permitted, as these CAIs were
designed to measure such issues.325
Proponents of using CAIs in child-custody evaluations believe it can
provide useful information in determining parental fitness, revealing the
emotional makeup of the parents and child and providing information
about maturity, antisocial tendencies, anxiety, depression, and
dangerousness.326 More importantly, proponents believe that it may
provide important information regarding which parent is better able to
raise the child.327 While CAIs can provide information about traditional
psychological constructs such as anxiety and depression, no test directly
measures functional parenting abilities.328 There are some CAIs that
test for certain parental attitudes and belief, but there is not enough
322. It is important that the Illinois Rules are structurally organized and comprehendible like
the California Rules because detailed rules that are structurally disorganized and laden with legal
jargon would not do any good for the courts or the evaluators subject to them.
323. See Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 23 (“The California Rule is detailed enough to
steer the child custody evaluation process in the right direction, yet flexible enough to comport
with the realities of the justice system.”).
324. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 170–71. But see Robert P. Archer et al., Introduction to
Forensic Uses of Clinical Assessment Instruments, in FORENSIC USES OF CLINICAL ASSESSMENT
INSTRUMENTS 14 (Robert P. Archer ed., 1st ed. 2006) (stating that CAIs may be used for forensic
purposes when they appropriate and relevant to the specific legal question).
325. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 560.
326. STANLEY KISSEL & NELSON W. FREELING, EVALUATING CHILDREN FOR COURTS USING
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 5 (1990); MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558.
327. KISSEL & FREELING, supra note 326, at 5; MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558.
328. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558; SCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 256, at 69; Roseby,
supra note 252, at 105.
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evidence to link these attitudes with actual behavior.329 Additionally,
projective measures such as the Rorschach have not been proven valid
or reliable for predicting custodial functioning.330
Therefore, while proponents of CAIs in child-custody proceedings
are correct in identifying the psychological constructs they can identify,
it is an unwarranted extrapolation to suggest that the results of
traditional psychological tests designed to test for something other than
parenting ability can shed light on that legal competency.331 Tests that
measure psychopathologies are relevant in the context of therapy and
diagnosing mental illness, however they have no place in a forensic
setting when its purpose is to determine what custodial situation is best
for a child.332
In the place of CAIs, FAIs are more favorable psychological
instruments because they are specifically designed for use in the legal
system to determine what the data says about psychological constructs
and how they relate to the relevant legal competency at issue in the
litigation.333
Rather than having CAIs provide data about an
examinee’s personality and have an evaluator make an inference as to
what that means about what situation is in the child’s best interest, the
evaluator will have data that were directly obtained through a test
“designed to conceptualize the relationship between legal definitions of
abilities and psychological constructs associated with human
capacities.”334
In addition to using FAIs, evaluators should conduct comprehensive
observation and interviewing of the parents, children, extended family,
teachers, and babysitters, as such people are in the best position to
discuss custodial preferences and any special needs of the children.335
Special attention should be given to the parents’ ability to cooperate, the
nature and intensity of disagreements about the children, and potential
areas of compromise.336 Further, the parent-child relationship should be
observed in the child’s principal home, as this will provide the most
329. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558; SCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 256, at 69.
330. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558; Weithorn & Grisso, supra note 259, at 165.
331. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 559 (“Tests of intellectual capacity, achievement,
personality style, and psychopathology assess constructs that are linked only indirectly, at best, to
the key issues concerning custody and visitation.”).
332. Id.
333. GRISSO, supra note 87, at 34–35.
334. See GRISSO, supra note 87, at 33 (discussing the conceptual objective of FAIs).
335. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558.
336. Id.; see Bow & Quinnell, supra note 10, at 164 (opining that it is imperative for
evaluators to consider developmental issues, strengths, and weaknesses of the parents and current
custody research in the evaluation process).
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realistic idea of the family dynamic.337
Ensuring high quality child-custody evaluations is important because
the focus of the evaluation is to ascertain what is in the child’s best
interest; therefore, these evaluations should be neutral, valid, and
conducted consistently in order to fulfill the evaluator’s legal obligation
to protect these interests.338
CONCLUSION
The lack of common-law and statutory guidelines for section 604(b)
evaluations leaves evaluators free to employ any method whatsoever in
coming to a conclusion about child-custody determinations, and this
often leads to the use of invalid clinical psychological tests that judges
tend to cling to in the courtroom. Judges, who can validate their
decisions by the use of “expert” opinion, tend to lean in favor of 604(b)
evaluators’ opinions and often let their ultimate custody decisions stem
from the potentially invalid and biased findings of these tests. This
ultimately may lead to placing children in a less-than-ideal situation,
which goes against one of the main objectives of the IMDMA:
mitigating the potential harm to spouses and their children caused by
the process of legally dissolving the marriage. Without clear guidelines
for 604(b) evaluators to follow in the course of their evaluations and the
abolishment of CAIs in these proceedings, Illinois courts run the risk of
making custody decisions based on an inaccurate picture of the child’s
environment, parents’ psychological capabilities, and the child’s
psychological capabilities. While preventing divorce and its negative
effects is impossible, Illinois can ensure, by way of airtight guidelines
and the non-use of CAIs, that children involved custody disputes do not
needlessly suffer at the hands of a legal system devoid of a
comprehensive way of ensuring that their best interests are protected.

337. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558.
338. Bow & Quinnell, supra note 10, at 164.

